

ОТНОШЕНИЯ РОССИИ И НАТО В КОНТЕКСТЕ КОЛЛЕКТИВНОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ

Аннотация: статья посвящена анализу того, как с завершением «холодной войны» проблемы войны и мира приобрели новое звучание. Надежды на то, что XXI век будет более безопасным для человечества, чем XX, пока не оправдываются.

Наблюдается рост численности ядерных, локальных, межгосударственных и внутригосударственных конфликтов. В условиях роста разрушительной силы обычного оружия, последствия этих конфликтов становятся все более опасными. Сохраняются разногласия по многим вопросам, в том числе и относящимся к сфере военной безопасности, между Российской Федерацией и Соединенными Штатами, которые остаются наиболее мощными в военном отношении державами современного мира.

Ключевые слова: неядерные, локальные, межгосударственные и внутригосударственные конфликты, военная безопасность.

Abstract: the article is devoted to the analysis of how, with the end of the Cold War, the problems of war and peace acquired a new meaning. Hopes that the 21st century will be safer for mankind than the 20th are not justified yet. There is an increase in the number of non-nuclear, local, interstate and intrastate conflicts. With the destructive power of conventional weapons growing, the consequences of these conflicts are becoming more dangerous. Differences remain on many issues, including those related to the sphere of military security, between the Russian Federation and the United States, which remain the most powerful military powers in the modern world.

Keywords: non-nuclear, local, interstate and intrastate conflicts, military security

The study of a potential adversary has long and firmly entered the agenda of current research in various branches of knowledge. Since 1993, the expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance to the East has formed one of the leading storylines in relations between Russia and the West, in the formation of Russian foreign policy in general, in the struggle of ideas and political currents on the issue of Russia's military-strategic orientation and, ultimately, account, about its civilizational affiliation. At the same time, the history of discussions about NATO expansion testifies to the deep differences in the perception of the problem by Russian and Western observers. The armed forces of the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) were created in 1949. Initially, the alliance was a "defensive alliance" of twelve states, including Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Holland, Norway, Portugal, Great Britain and the United States. In 1955, West Germany became the 15th member of the alliance. In this composition, the alliance existed for the next 27 years, until Spain joined it. In 1990, following the appearance of a united Germany on the map of Europe, this united state also joined NATO and the process of NATO expansion continues.

In 1991, the first cautious hints appeared about the possibility of NATO expansion to the East due to the desire of a number of groupings in the leading circles of the Eastern European countries for maximum rapprochement with NATO.

Very soon, the "NATO factor" becomes one of the most important issues in the internal political struggle in Russia. A non-factional association of more than 200 deputies, Anti-NATO, was

created in the State Duma. They considered and evaluated the balance of military forces in various options for NATO expansion and the possible consequences.

The NATO bloc tried to keep a strict distance from Russia. The “Russian factor”, due to poor predictability, was perceived as a source of possible danger. On May 27, 1997, in Paris, Russia signed the Founding Act on Relations, Cooperation and Security with the alliance in order to limit the damage from the first wave of NATO expansion. However, the time elapsed after the signing of the Founding Act and until the temporary severance of Russia's relations with this organization in connection with the events in the Balkans in the spring and summer of 1999 showed that the experts' calculations were not justified. The NATO military operation against Yugoslavia (FRY) was the best confirmation of the minimal importance that NATO attached to the Founding Act: the very fact of the bombings violated a number of basic principles of the alliance's relations with Russia, laid down in the Act - such as "renunciation of the use of force or threat of force against each other." against a friend or against any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence and “the prevention of conflicts and the settlement of disputes by peaceful means.

And although the attack on the FRY became a kind of "moment of truth" for relations between Russia and NATO, the crisis was largely prepared by the entire previous course of their development. With the beginning of the NATO aggression against Yugoslavia, Russia, which had previously advocated the resolution of the Kosovo problem by peaceful means within the framework of the UN and / or the OSCE, turned out to be the only major European power that was not directly involved in hostilities, which made it the main candidate for the role of mediator between the warring parties.

In the context of the rupture of relations with NATO, the decision on the participation of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in the NATO operation as part of the International Security Presence Force in Kosovo (KFOR) caused a far from unambiguous reaction both in Russian society and among specialists who put forward three main counterarguments:

- 1) Lack of clarity on the extent to which such participation is in the interests of Russia's national security;
- 2) The absence of a separate Russian sector in Kosovo;
- 3) Difficulties with financing the Russian contingent in Kosovo.

Only by the autumn of 1999 did Russia's relations with NATO return to the level that preceded the conclusion of the Founding Act between them.

With the collapse of the state, the system of political values of one of the main centers of power, which largely determined the structure of international relations, was violated, and this meant a redistribution of roles on the world stage, a lowering of the status of Russia and the possibility of its influence on the course of events in the world.

Despite the fact that the leadership of both countries announced their desire to establish relationships on the principles of partnership, they did not become such. Moreover, today Moscow and Washington have much less true understanding of the interests and motivations of the other side on issues of its national security than it was during the Cold War period. One of the significant factors that bind the relations between the two countries today is the danger of international terrorism, although the process of cooperation in this area is also ambiguous.

After the collapse of the USSR, NATO faced the problem of external adaptation to new international conditions and issues of internal restructuring in the face of the changed nature of the main threats to international security. The problems of regulating numerous centers of regional tension came to the fore, and this turned into one of the key areas of world politics, acquired a sharply militarized character, forceful appeasement dramatically prevailed over the “traditional peacekeeping” of the Cold War era.

The main burden of responding to the "new challenges" of international security fell on the United States as the only world superpower. However, at the transitional stage in the development of international relations, which is characterized not by absolute, but by relative, or "softened", unipolarity, the sole burden of responsibility for maintaining global security turned out to be unbearable even for the United States, which made the task of strengthening allied relations with European partners in NATO the main one. An American foreign policy priority, the military-political structures of NATO joined in the search for an adequate response to the "new challenges" of European security as part of the development and implementation of a new anti-crisis strategy of the alliance.

The NATO anti-crisis strategy has become one of the main directions of the internal transformation of the alliance and it was developed in close connection with the strategy of its expansion (external adaptation). It was necessary to solve the problem of the participation of NATO's combined armed forces in military operations, which, firstly, would not be directly related to ensuring the defense of the member states of the alliance, and secondly, would take place outside its territorial "zone of responsibility". Thus, both the strategic functions of the alliance and its geographic orientation were subject to revision.

Deprived of a counterbalance in the form of an opposing "superpower", feeling virtual impunity, the US ruling circles began to allow the use of military power even in situations where the country's vital interests were not affected. Under the guise of creating a humane world order or protecting the national interests of the United States, forms of wars have become more widespread in modern conditions, blurring the line between the state of peace and war to an even greater extent than it was during the Cold War. All this leads to an increase in the number of countries that are interested in creating their own forces to "deter" the United States from military interventions. All this makes the world no less, but more dangerous and unstable.

At the present stage, the NATO military-political bloc, by definition, is not adapted to provide the entire range of measures related to the implementation of a peaceful settlement. Moreover, in some cases, NATO intervention in the most acute ethno-political contradictions, including at an early stage, has a destabilizing effect and rather serves as a means of aggravating conflicts than contributing to their settlement (the clearest example of this is the Kosovo crisis of 1998-1999 and March 17, 2004 year, war in Iraq).

Beginning in 1993 in Russia, officials and most of the experts involved in "realpolitik" viewed expansion as a consolidated strategy of the West (or at least the American elites) and tried to either influence the situation with unsubstantiated threats or limit the damage by agreements with NATO on private matters - thereby demonstrating to supporters and opponents alike

The war in the Balkans and the adoption of NATO's New Strategic Concept marked a fundamental change in the existing structure of global politics. For the first time in the entire post-colonial history, the military-political situation in the world is determined by the expansion of the military bloc of the richest and most prosperous states, which does not have any significant counterbalance in the form of other blocs and organizations. The United Nations, not to mention other international institutions, has demonstrated its impotence and increasing marginality in relation to NATO. A virtual monopoly of NATO in matters of European security has been established. Finally, the expansion of NATO, combined with the Balkan war, marked a change of milestones in Russian domestic politics: for the first time in a long time, it created the ground for a national consensus on at least one strategic issue, and, moreover, on terms acceptable and favorable to the ruling elite.

It should be noted that the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program played a very positive role in establishing relations between Russia and NATO. This program, focused on bilateral cooperation between the military departments of NATO and Eastern European countries, was developed in the

fall of 1993 by the Pentagon and the Chiefs of Staff in cooperation with Secretary of State W. Christopher and his deputy S. Talbott. The PfP program was a political response of the American military departments, which were generally not interested in accelerated NATO expansion against the backdrop of cuts in defense spending, to the situation created after B. Yeltsin's Warsaw statement on the admissibility of Poland's entry into NATO and the start of a mass public campaign of the Polish American Congress together with Z. Brzezinski and G. Kissinger for the speedy expansion of the alliance. The adoption of the PfP program by the Brussels NATO summit in January 1994 gave Russia additional time to develop a strategy in relations with the alliance, without removing the issue of expanding the alliance from the agenda.

In Russia, the adoption of the PfP program caused a surge of euphoria, but those observers who did not share it turned out to be right and believed that the "great game" around NATO expansion was just beginning.

In 1997-2000 in the Clinton administration, M. Albright and W. Cohen, tough supporters of expansion, were appointed to the key posts of secretary of state and secretary of defense. Despite this, Washington's official policy was to simultaneously move "on two tracks" towards the expansion of the alliance and the codification of the "special relationship" between NATO and Russia. The initiators of NATO expansion intended to build an agreement with Russia in such a way that the structure created on its basis (the future Permanent Joint Council) would be limited to information and advisory functions and exclude any role of Russia in making decisions that are within the competence of the alliance. Such an agreement was also intended to remove the hypothetical issue of Russia's entry into NATO from the agenda, since the task of drawing Russia into treaty relations with the alliance had already been resolved.

The main problem of using NATO to integrate Russia into European structures lies not in relations between NATO and Russia, but in the North Atlantic Alliance itself. Despite the public's favorable attitude towards the meeting in Prague, US officials have expressed doubts about the future prospects for NATO's development.

Analyzing the evolution of NATO during the Cold War and after it, one can identify five main tasks in the field of ensuring political or military security, which the North Atlantic Alliance serves or is intended to serve. The first three tasks faced NATO during the Cold War. The other two were formulated in search of answers to the changes that have taken place in modern conditions:

1. Collective self-defense and containment of the threat of attack on NATO members in Europe (Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty).
2. Ensuring transparency and trust among NATO members.
3. Ensuring democracy and civilian control over the armed forces.
4. Peacekeeping, peace enforcement and humanitarian intervention..
5. Fight against terrorism.

The key problem of Russian security and foreign policy is the persistent image of Russia as an unprincipled force that takes into account only material factors - an image that has taken root not only in the West, but also in the East, not only among the elites, but also in broad sections of public opinion. In the same vein, on the whole, is the pragmatic course outlined at the beginning of 2000 to unfreeze relations with NATO, which helps the Russian authorities in solving its short-term tasks, but does not remove issues of long-term national security and the preservation of the European aspect of Russian identity from the agenda. Such a foreign policy is limited to passive defense and adjustment to the onslaught of multinational coalitions mobilized to implement not only the interests of their leaders, but also popular ideas for improving the world order. In this case, the expansion of

Euro-Atlantic structures to Russia's borders in one form or another will probably continue. It is also worth mentioning what points the NATO 2030 doctrine includes:

1. Collective defense
2. Crisis management
3. The principle of security.

To ensure it, it is planned to use Swedish-Norwegian missiles, a French howitzer, Swedish cartridges, and a drone capable of blowing up one person. Appropriate plans have been developed:

Plan Barbarossa 2 - a plan to capture Ukraine. What was told by Pierre Place, a retired French intelligence officer. Another plan will be aimed at deterring an aggressive Russia, and involves the inclusion of outer space in the sphere of military operations.

NATO Interest in Civilian Communications Routes, 5G.

QAT countries – Australia, Japan, Australia, India did not join

The Council for Inclusive Capitalism was created with the Vatican at the head

EADS European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company

The Arctic Doctrine and the US Africa Doctrine have been developed.

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Найданова Э.Б.

к.э.н., доцент

Лундаев М.В.

магистрант

Восточно-Сибирский государственный университет технологий и управления,
Россия, г. Улан-Удэ

ОЦЕНКА КАДРОВОГО СОСТАВА ОРГАНА ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ ВЛАСТИ

Аннотация: для эффективной реализации поставленных задач перед органами государственного управления необходим кадровый потенциал, который бы отвечал всем требованиям. В связи с этим мониторинг кадрового состава в органах госуправления проводится на регулярной основе. В статье проведена оценка кадрового состава на примере Забайкальского управления Федеральной службы по экологическому, технологическому и атомному надзору (Ростехнадзор). На основании проведенного исследования авторами были определены основные проблемы при реализации кадровой политики в Ростехнадзоре.

Ключевые слова: кадровая политика, государственная служба, кадровый состав, кадровый резерв.