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World community as a reasoned community?
A retrospective analysis of the US diplomatic persuasion
on the Iraq war

If and when the US would lead a war in Iraq was the question that captured the attention of the world in March 2003, at the time when I had the opportunity to be a visiting teacher in the University of Panjab, Chandigarh. The mission which the Bush administration had taken upon itself of combating global terrorism after the events of September 11, 2001, had already aroused mixed feelings, and now there, in India and also in Europe, was an outright criticism of the 'American arrogance' and 'historical short-sightedness'. In Chandigarh, few students of international relations believed that the war would actually begin: how could any country afford going against the majority of world opinion? In my part of the world, the North of Europe, the critical voices were more cynical and predicted that once in place the war machinery could not be stopped. Moreover, many people also supported the American policies.

The war began in late March and lasted till the end of April. Once the well-expected military victory of Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld's 'war of the 21st century' had been confirmed, the pros and cons of the intervention became more confused because the world could now see that there is also an humanitarian aspect to the justification of the war. Not weapons of mass destruction but mass graves were found. However, although it is clear that many Iraqis wish Saddam dead, the post-war developments show also that in many cases they prefer him to the Americans. The assessment of the victory will have to wait for a long time, as will in the more limited military sense the stabilisation, which frequently is disturbed with sporadic violence and is a long-term battle. This conflict is different from Bosnia, 1995, and Afghanistan, 2001, in the sense that the US has not been able to define the task in such a way that success can be demonstrated almost automatically. Iraq in 2003 is not a surgical military operation but an immensely complicated question of building a path for viable political development in a country where democracy also means giving vent to the explosive Shiite identities suppressed under Saddam's regime. The assessment of this success will certainly be the topic of much literature in the years to come, and it cannot be our task in this presentation written only shortly after the war.

This article deals with the meaning of the war in Iraq for the IR student who thinks that there is nothing as practical as a good theory. In view of the legacy of IR theory, it is important to remind the student and also the wider audience that when the Bush administration, with reference to the necessity to resort to arms, speaks of the US national and world interest, the notion is very different from the realist statesmanship advocated by the discipline's power

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theorists such as Hans J. Morgenthau, Raymond Aron and Edward Hallett Carr. Rather, the combination of world interest and national power represents the normative universalism and rationalization of particular interest that is the primary object of the realists' criticism and a point of departure for outlining their approach. While Hans J. Morgenthau speaks of the prudence and circumstantial wisdom of rational statesmanship, for which the ultimate concern is always the preservation of the political community, the US president, George W. Bush, can be seen to have an impressive record of within only a few months, in early 2003, wrecking apart NATO, the UN Security Council, and also public opinion in his country. The French realist Raymond Aron's reminder of the dangers of ideological illusion continues to be relevant in the post-Cold War world, and E.H. Carr's «weapon of the relativity of thought» is ever useful for the criticism of universalist standards of democracy and development[1]. Although many writers have noted that the more reserved 'great power realism', which George W. Bush advocated during his presidential campaign, after the terrorist attack in September 2001 took a turn towards a bold globalism, IR scholars seem to have reflected little on the question of how the first-mentioned approach, in the more serious sense of a theoretical legacy of our discipline — International Relations — can offer critical insights for the analysis of the second, and do so in ways that can yield results more fruitful than one more round of the debate between idealism and realism[2].

This article argues three points. First, rather than thinking that the post-'September 11' world calls for new beginnings and new theories, I emphasise the importance of recalling the legacy of realist theory and the possibility to use the «weapon of the relativity of thought» for showing how the US way of reasoning about world politics reflects the particular experience and ways of thinking in that country. As always, contextualization is the IR student's means to undermine the intellectual hegemony which, in the cognitive sense, becomes possible by means of naturalised realities and conceptions of history. To emphasise the relativity of thought is also important in order to recall the essential meaning of realism, which all too often is forgotten with the trivialisation of theory that equates realism with crude power struggle. I have in mind the consideration of world politics in its actual practices not *a priori* ideas, a basically pragmatist point of departure which begins with practice and does not approach it as the fact bifurcated from the world of ideas[3].

My second point goes beyond the first and argues that it is not sufficient and not a very fruitful critical stand to simply oppose oneself to the American ways and, for example, from a similarly fixed position maintain that there are 'hidden' imperialist motivations that are the 'real' motivations for the war beyond what is only seeming or apparent. This means also that it is not sufficient to reveal the relativity of thought that sees thought in its connections of time and place, but the pertinent question is about the possibility and substantive space of

[1] «The weapon of the relativity of thought must be used to demolish the utopian concept of a fixed and absolute standard by which policies and actions can be judged". *Carr E.H.* The Twenty Years Crisis 1919—1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations. L.: Macmillan, 1978. P.75; see: P.71—80 (the second edition of 1946, first published in 1939).

[2] The Bush administration's approach to world politics has been widely discussed in Foreign Affairs. See, for example: *Hirsh M.* Bush and the World // Foreign Affaires. 2002. September/October; *Ikenberry G.J.* America's Imperial Ambition // Ibidem. Ikenberry's article exemplifies the realist 'wisdom outlook' critique of policies, but does not do so in a way that articulately uses IR theory. This situation shows how, in IR, the policy discourse and the critical theoretical discourse evolve regrettably apart.

[3] *Carr E.H.* Op. cit.; Morgenthau H. J. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 5 ed. N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973 (first published in 1948).

communication, and not necessarily in the sense that assumes that communication can proceed on the basis of some pre-existing, shared framework of knowledge (which Richard Rorty calls the epistemological moment). Rather, we need to examine the range of possible agreement or, at least, ask about the points of disagreement. Articulation of disagreement serves communicative purposes (Rorty's hermeneutical moment) when the interlocutors are able to see how their respective approaches are mutually opposed, and hence are able to (re)locate themselves in the matrix of the discourse possible on the basis of the cultural and linguistic resources available. A dialogical process of communication transforms both the producer and the receiver of the discourse.

Outlining an approach that renders possible such dialogical relations of communication involves my third point. The study of rhetoric has in my mind much more to offer International Relations than has been acknowledged in recent decades. In their well-known argument according to which realism is a persuasive discourse and not an explanatory theory, Beer and Harimann (1996) argue a 'rhetorical turn' in the study of international relations. This article continues on the way already paved by these authors but maintains that Charm Perelman's New Rhetoric, which these authors, too, emphasize, remains still narrow in the 'turn' demonstrated. By the narrow application I refer to the uses of Perelman's rhetoric as a technique of analysis, rather than examining how rhetorical strategies function to (re)create the normative and moral boundaries of our world. In the problem formulation of this article, these boundaries outline the international and world community we acknowledge and are ready to stand and even fight for.

In the study of international relations the rhetorical approach, which deals with human agency in the contingent world, presents a sharp contrast to the conceptual discourse and systemic approaches which for long have predominated the discipline. Rhetoric is particularly well suited for the study of situations which in the normative sense are in transition, and in which the moral boundaries are not clear and settled. Although international and world community for obvious reasons always has been a contested concept, the conflict on Iraq in 2003 represents a moment of change which in dramatic ways tells how the post-World War II international order is transforming, and is doing so under pressures that relate to the interests of the US in the post-Cold War world, on the one hand, and the quest for a more global legitimacy of the institutions representing world community on the other hand.

Our discussion of the uses of rhetoric for the critical purposes of pragmatist and realist approaches may begin with a notion of E.H. Carr, a notion which for Timothy Dunne makes Carr a 'proto-constructivist', a forerunner of the more recent orientations. According to Carr, *«There is a world community for the reason (and for no other), that people talk, and within certain limits behave, as if there were a world communit»*[4].

Dunne's reading of Carr is in the perspective of the more current paradigm that emphasises the linguistic and historical contingency of representations of reality. In the same train of thought, rhetoric is not about the study of linguistic ornament and manipulative usage of words — which notion, reflecting the dichotomies of modern science, is the conventional understanding of rhetoric. Instead, rhetoric is a means of linguistic (but not only verbal) expression, which is constitutive of its objects in a sense that presumes and by no means denies the existence of a reality independent of interpretative minds (epistemological realism). As many authors have pointed out, rhetoric cannot be conceived apart from its

[4] *Carr E. H.* Op.cit. P. 162; *Dunne T.* The Social Construction of International Society // European Journal of International Relations. 1995. Vol. 1. № 3. September. P. 375 (367–389).

neighbouring fields, such as philosophy, poetics, and grammar. The comprehension sustaining the present study is that the philosophical underpinnings of rhetoric are basically pragmatist. Rhetoric is understood to be part of the process of production and interpretation by which a yet undetermined 'reality' is signified and gains a discursive meaning.

This study examines how the rhetorical means of communication, which make use of the linguistic and cultural resources available to a speaker, outline the normative and moral boundaries of our reality and more specifically the international and world community that a speaker seeks to address and call forth in the audience. For the purposes of our analysis, world community is approached as the 'universal audience' of the communicative act, a 'model audience' that, rather than telling about the actual audience as such, locates the speaker in a matrix of possible discourse. Chaïm Perelman speaks of the universal audience as the audience which, for a speaker, 'addresses all reasoning human beings'[5]. The notion is fundamentally historical and effective to the extent that it meets the actual, in time and place specified audience[6]. The rhetorical act is successful to the extent that it manages to 'prove' itself to be 'true' in the sense that the actual audience can appropriate and apply the message on the basis of its own experience.

Our analysis further on invites the reader to initiate a dialogue with the Bush administration by listening to a speech by Secretary of State Colin Powell, a speech given at the World Economic Forum in Davos on January 26, 2003[7]. In this speech, the Secretary seeks to convince his international audience about the legitimacy of the events that soon were to unfold. For the analytical purposes of our study, the speaker — the US government speaking through the position of the Secretary of State — is textually reconstructed in the three aspects of classical rhetoric, which outline the *speaker* in relation to the *audience* and also in relation to the *message*. *Ethos* is the aspect of the text that refers back to the speaker, *pathos* is the quality that seeks to arouse feeling in the audience, and *logos* ('word', 'reason') is the message which, in each instance of the discourse, seeks to unite the speaker and the audience. In the ontological sense, this means that a speaker is not approached in the aspect of substance (such as given interests or nature) but 'exists' only in the regularities of being, which in this study are rhetorical strategies constitutive of a practical relationship with the world and, by the same logic, of a normative projection of the self. The analytical scheme of the rhetorical 'triangle' presupposes that the speaker, although the content of the speech is not unambiguous, seeks to address the audience seriously and to present this audience with an argument to which it can adhere. The three elements, in which the second involves a logical opposition to the first and the third seeks reconciliation of the other two, constitute a mutual dynamism that in this way actualises the classical idea of dialectic.

Identification of the 'universal audience' of the speech in the three aspects of classical rhetoric gives us the preliminary points of departure for a *sceptical* argument

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[5] *Perelman C.* The Realm of Rhetoric. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982. P. 16–18.

[6] If the speaker addresses a group of, say, medical doctors, this group is a specialized audience in the sense of its specific denotative relations (physician so-and-so, representing a definable set of professional practices). Simultaneously, it is the speaker's universal audience in the sense of the reasoning beings that the speaker addresses without heeding to these individuating characteristics. (Perelman, ibid.) In other words, the universal audience is an idea and a projection of being that, for the speaker, transcends a particular historical being. Because the Secretary's speech addresses the global audience as a whole (rather than, say, business people or journalists as a group), the conceptual distinction between specialized and universal audience is not in the methodical sense used in this study.

The full text of the speech is available on the US Department of State website with the title 'Remarks at the World Economic Forum, Secretary Colin L. Powell, Davos, Switzerland, January 26, 2003', http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/16869.htm.

which also calls into question the specific historical notion of the audience. Dialogue opens up in the rudimentary sense of Socratic dialectic: a method of discourse which, by proceeding from some initial, commonsensical agreement, seeks to display the contradictions and controversial points in the opponent's position. We will ask by what elements of an *initial consensus* does the speaker in this case first seek to build up a communicative relationship with the audience? Secondly, by what types of verbal techniques and strategies is this initial consensus *transferred* to the already more controversial conclusion, which in the Secretary's speech is the call for support for the US policies and actions in Iraq. Verbal techniques (such as the use of analogies and examples, argument in terms of cause-effect relations, etc.) *connect ideas* and give them *presence* in front of an audience. These techniques form rhetorical strategies which, in further analysis of inter-textual relations, can be identified as discursive practices and traditions. Making usage of E.H. Carr's «weapon of the relativity of thought» means seeing how these practices and ways of thinking reflect particular interests and emerge in specific historical contexts with distinct institutional and circumstantial aspects[8].

Carr's critical notion draws from the epistemic conceptions of Karl Mannheim, who in his 1936 work «Ideology and Utopia» argued that facts exist always in a context, and it is only through an awareness of the particular in our knowing that we can reach» something of understanding the 'whole of reality'[9]. Being aware of how our thought and action is socially and historically conditioned frees us from the illusion that we can possess a universal truth. The 'truth' which we can reach is always only partial and, to the extent that there is a possibility of overcoming the limited knowledge of a perspective that reflects a 'situated being', it is in the *awareness* that it is a perspective only[10]. A contemporary writer, Steven Chan, speaks of the perspectiveness of knowing as the «Rashomon condition of IR». Borrowing from a title of a film by the Japanese director Akira Kurosawa, Chan argues against the modern, epistemological presuppositions of the possibility of attaining universally valid knowledge. Kurosawa's film spoke of different interpretations of a crime scene and how the same event can provide different protagonising representations of it, made with a different language and reflecting different ontological conditions and social positions of speaking[11]. Instead of proposing his truth, the director leaves it to the thinking audience to judge the possible truth.

The warheads found in Iraq on the threshold of the war, the threat posed by the Samud II missiles, and the threat represented by Saddam Hussein himself to international peace and security exemplify very well the 'Rashomon condition of IR'. The existence of the threat is not independent of the contingencies of language and history but to a significant extent a matter of the specific connections of ideas that in institutionalised practices and with reference to their 'truth

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[8] E.H. Carr can be seen to begin with a rudimentary pragmatist epistemology (or an ontological critique of epistemology) when he argues that «Thought is not merely relative to the circumstances and interests of the thinker: it is also pragmatic in the sense that it is directed to the fulfilment of his purposes» (*Carr E.H.* Op. cit. P. 71.) As for example Charles Jones points out, awareness of how our thinking has been conditioned by a particular social order is logically related to the conclusion that this order can also be changed (*Buzan B., Jones Ch., and Little R.* The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism. N. Y.: Columbia University Press, 1993. P. 170—178).

[9] *Mannheim K.* Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge. L.: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1948 (first published by Harvest Books in 1936).

[10] E.H. Carr can also be read in a way that shows the beginning of an 'ontological turn' relating to this issue. For example, Carr suggests that by seeing how power, in a given time frame, has a territorial basis and takes the shape of the state we can attain a more general understanding of power. See: *Carr E.H.* Op. cit. P. 102—109, 230—235.

[11] *Chan S.* Towards a Multicultural Rashomon Paradigm in International Relations // Tampere Peace Research Institute. Research Report. Tampere, 1996. № 74. P. 93—123, esp. 118. See also: The Zen of International Relations: IR Theory from East to West / Ed. by S. Chan, P. Mandaville and R. Bleiker. Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001.

regimes' produce credible claims of threat. For the purposes of the present article, the Rashomon condition brings to the fore and elaborates the ontological dimension in the Mannheimian type of argument. It tells how the problem of the relativity of thought leads us to questions answerable not only by a 'sociology of knowledge' but also through understanding how a speaker's projected universality is a historical reason relative to its circumstances and relational to our own conceptions. Colin Powell presents his audience with evidence about a crime scene, and our task in the sense of the critical audience is to see how the perspective offered relates to our own and, on this basis, to seek the reasoned judgement that Kurosawa, Chan, and Perelman alike believe we can make in spite of the all-pervasive presence of the world's 'propaganda industry'.

Our discourse in this study is with the text, rather than with a historical speaker with his individuating characteristics. The text has been authorised by an institution, the US Department of the State representative of the Bush administration. The Secretary of State — rather than, say, the President or the Secretary of Defence — is the chosen focus of analysis because it is the specific task of this agent to convince the European allies of the US and the entire world audience about the legitimacy of the war. Notifying that the person here speaks from an institutional position means that the locutionary act cannot reasonably be analysed in isolation from the rules and procedures that give legitimacy to the total illocutionary act and make it a *performative* act with practical consequences. As my terminology already suggests, I would like to point out that in the field of international relations — a world primarily not of individual human beings but more often of 'agents' and 'actors' — rhetorical analysis needs to be combined with the basic presuppositions of speech act theory. This means that saying that the notion of international or world community is in a flux is also to say that it is not clear which forums and institutions are entitled to speak *for* and *on behalf of* this community[12]. For example, the coalition which outside the UN resorts to arms cannot claim legitimacy in terms of the concept of world community symbolized by the world body and, doing so, risks producing what in the terminology of the Austinian speech act theory is a 'misfire'.

Unlike those who deplore the rift that has emerged in the Security Council over Iraq and on this basis conclude that the world body now, like the League of Nations before it, shows itself as regrettably weak, I would like to think that international forums that can endure open disagreement best reflect the present-day realities and therefore also ultimately have more strength than any action that ignores such forums. As already indicated, the basic thrust of this study does not relate so much to the actions in Iraq as it seeks to examine what is made of this conflict for the purposes of constructing conceptions of international and world community. If the US now seeks to suffocate the argumentative discourse by threatening those opposed to her policies with different types of diplomatic sanctions, it is all the more important to seek to maintain the moral space for world community as a *reasoned* community. In this task, the New Rhetoric of Chaïm Perelman, an approach which builds on the classical inheritance of Aristoteles's rhetoric and dialectical reasoning, offers one way for the analyst. The pragmatist approach which transcends the dichotomies between rhetoric and 'truth', words and the 'real', makes it possible to ask how moral spaces and

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[12] Similarly, for those who interpret Resolution 1441 to commit the international community represented by the Security Council to 'severe consequences' meaning war (a further interpretation that actualises Ch. VII of the UN Charter) the Resolution that fails to bring these consequences is 'unhappy' if not procedurally flawed. 'Unhappy' in the sense of the classical speech act theory means that the statement lacks corresponding attitudes. John L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981 (second edition, first published in 1962).

identities are created and reproduced in argumentative discourse. It does not matter so much whether we, you and I as the actual audience of the speech, here represent the practitioner and theorist of IR or the man and the woman for whom the synchronisation of experience by televised news — globalisation — has enlarged the international dimension of being. Pausing to listen to what Colin Powell had to say in Davos on January 26, 2003, offers all of us a moment of retrospective reflection and a possibility to reconsider the argumentation.

The 'soldier' and the 'diplomat' has a literal reference in Colin L. Powell, former general of the Gulf War and later on the Foreign Secretary of the administration of President George W. Bush. The words are borrowed from the French realist theorist Raymond Aron, who meant them as a metaphor of the domain of action in international relations. In this more abstract sense, and faithfully to Aron's realism, the words in this presentation inform of an interest to study world politics with emphasis on «the passions, the follies, the ideas and the violences» of a time[13], of a time which in our study is symbolically represented by the numeromagical figure '9−11'.

The passions of a time cannot adequately be dealt with at the systemic level of theorisation predominant in our discipline, and the fruitfulness of rhetorical analysis in this connection is that it focuses on the historically situated agent and the *rhetorical situation*. The rhetorical situation is defined not only by the circumstances of time and place but also by the conventional *frames* that make communication possible and legitimate. These frames are, for one thing, institutional; in this sense they relate to and can be specified by the formal conditions of a serious speech act, which refer to the status of the speaker and the adequacy of the procedures and forums for a performative act (i.e. an act which, rather than describing a state of affairs, sets up or brings about this state of affairs in the act of speaking). The performative character of the Secretary's speech is obvious due to the fact that it is an authoritative statement of US policy, and this policy did not in the same sense exist *before* this statement.

Frames are also semantic and discursive. The organizers of the Davos meeting had framed the agenda by the words «building trust in a better future». The Secretary's speech makes use of this element in its argument, which clearly has one central message: Trust the US, even if it goes to war without any authorization from the Security Council. The speech begins with a personal note, telling the audience that:

I've been here for just over a day, long enough to speak and meet with a number of you, long enough to hear directly and from others much of what has been said about the United States over the last two or three days, about whether America can be trusted to use its enormous political, economic, and above all, military power, wisely and fairly.

I believe — no, I know with all my heart — that the United States can. I believe no less strongly that the Unites States has earned the trust of men, women, and children around the world (p. 1).

To win the hearts and minds of the world was now pertinent, and not a very easy task, because on this occasion the Secretary also tells that «we will not join a consensus if we believe it compromises our principles» (p. 2), and «we continue to reserve our sovereign right to take military action against Iraq alone or in a coalition of the willing» (p. 4).

Above we have already noted that the rhetorical success of an argument can be examined by asking to what extent the argument can transfer an initial consensus (with which the speaker first appeals to the audience) to the desired but already more controversial conclusion. Accordingly, the question for our study is, firstly, what good reasons (*eulogos*) are presented to the world audience and offered as

[13] *Aron R.* Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations. S.L., 1966 (1959). P. 600.

an initial consensus on the basis of which the argument may proceed? Secondly, by what kinds of verbal techniques and strategies is the initial agreement offered transferred to the conclusion which asks for support for the US action? In the following chapters, the initial consensus is identified in three major and some additional, minor elements in the speech. The first is the notion that (i) the greatest danger of our age is the nexus of tolerance and terror, of terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. The second is concerned about defending (ii) the credibility of the Security Council and the world community in the face of «Saddam's naked defiance». Most of us have no problem in agreeing with these points of departure. However, the conclusion which on this basis lends support to US actions and is ready to entrust this country with the leadership of the world is already a much more controversial issue. The third element for an initial consensus is a little more problematic for the critical observer. It asks us (iii) to look at the historical record of America and to see that this country in previous conflicts has used its enormous power for the good of the world community. In addition to these notions, we shall briefly look at how consensus is built in relation to the European allies and other major powers such as Russia and China (iv, v).

The verbal techniques and strategies by which the initial consensus first sought is transferred to the desired conclusion can be identified in a variety of ways, and our analysis in this presentation can be only briefly illustrative. The question of which types of techniques are in focus is a question of their relevance for the analysis and interpretation of the specific discourse. Our study of the Secretary's speech will first look at arguments that are based on claims concerning the structure of reality, i.e. arguments that build on what presumably already has been acknowledged *as* reality. These are notably arguments that operate with cause-effect relationships and the assumption that an act or an event manifests an aspect of 'essence'. Another chapter will focus on arguments that by means of examples, illustrations, and models — all of which imply the operation of some overriding rule, law or principle — serve to *establish* structures of reality (Perelman, 1982, pp. 81–113).

The danger of our age and the credibility of world community: «The nexus of tolerance and terror, of terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, is the greatest danger of our age» (p. 3).

If we recognize the new danger, should we also lend our support to the US policies? Examination of the question of how the Secretary of State seeks to persuade us on this issue may begin by first looking at the following assertions:

To those who say, «Why not give the inspection process more time?», I ask: «How much more time does Iraq need to answer those questions? It is not a matter of time alone, it is a matter of telling the truth, and so far *Saddam Hussein still responds with evasion and with lies.*

Saddam should tell the truth, and tell the truth now. *The more we wait, the more chance there is* for this dictator with clear ties to terrorist groups, including al-Qaida, more time for him to pass a weapon, share a technology, or use these weapons again (p. 3, italics added).

It can be noted that claims concerning existent realities are based on a combination of arguments operating with cause-effect relationships and arguments of essence. The types of explanations, which approach actions and events in international politics as manifestations of an 'inner essence'[14], is the characterizing feature of what many observers have called the Bush administration's 'missionary'

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[14] This is the conception according to which acts of existence manifest the aspect of essence (ex-sistere). A concise introduction to the critique of the scholastic thinking, the thinking which has been immensely influential in western metaphysics, is provided for example in John D. Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics. N. Y.: Fordham University Press, 1982.

account of world affairs. The election slogans of the presidential candidate — 'we will rid the world of evil-doers' — project a world of two kinds of substance. Following this logic, the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction is not, as such, the problem, but the danger is constituted by their possession by *a regime like Saddam Hussein's*. Where the danger is about «Saddam Hussein and others *of his ilk*» (p. 3) demolishing the weapons, presumably first verified by the UN inspectors, cannot logically be a sufficient solution.

It can be also noted that the delay in time is argued to increase the *probability* of the danger. The danger of our time, which has to do with evil as an immanent part of reality (ontology of substance), is argued to be imminent and become more acute through relations of causality which in the Perelmanian terminology are *quasi-causal*. The argument invokes images of a calculated probability, although it deals with something that is only more or less plausible as an argument and cannot be inferred with formal-logical procedures (Perelman, 1982, pp. 53–80). Additionally the following sentences inform of how the reality argued in causal relations — the evidence used for making the case against Saddam — is contingent on a worst-case scenario:

What happened to nearly 30,000 munitions capable of carrying chemical agents? The inspectors can only account for only 16 of them. Where are they? It's not a matter of ignoring the reality of the situation. Just think, all of these munitions, which perhaps only have a short range if fired out of an artillery weapon in Iraq, but *imagine if* one of these weapons were smuggled out of Iraq and found its way into the hands of a terrorist organization who could transport it anywhere in the world (p. 3).

It has not been possible — as president Bush has also stated — to establish a link between Saddam's regime and the events of 11 September, 2001. Arguments such as the one that says that the groups at the Iranian border are «closely connected with» al-Qaida add to the threat scenario but do not verify a causal relation with epistemic objectivity. Factual relations that can justify Iraq as a target of the US pre-emptive strike have not been possible to verify in the same way that we can, for example, say that the signs of the use of chemical weapons in human bodies in Iran are a proof of Saddam's use of these weapons in the war between the two countries in 1986–9, or that the Taleban regime more or less intentionally let international terrorist activity take refuge in the country. Most importantly, also the official *casus belli* — the existence of the argued weapons of mass destruction — seems to remain more a question of imaginary inference than of actual findings[15]. Old facts are used for new purposes when it is suggested that weapons development programmes (documents found) indicate that the threat, which was claimed to justify the war, actually existed[16]. Yet the chain of reasoning, which argues that a terrorist organization like al-Qaida *can* get WMDs from 'rogue regimes', and consequently not only the disarmament but also regime change in such states is needed, is an argument which, already in early 2003, world-wide prepared the ground for combating the new danger. This argument we know not only from the Bush administration but also from the speeches of notably Prime Minister Tony Blair and his Secretary of Foreign Affairs Jack Straw. In the aftermath of the Iraq war, the world seems to have become hostage to a logic that *globalises the experience of terrorism* and by creating

[15] The case in point is the suggestion by Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld in May 2003 that these weapons were likely to have been destroyed by Saddam Hussein shortly before the war.

[16] Similarly anachronistic evidence is the argument by President Bush (July 30, 2003) that although his previous announcement (January 29, 2003) according to which Iraq had more recently bought uranium from Niger proved to be unfounded, it is known that Iraq did buy uranium from this country during the 1980s.

the effects prognosticated also draws more and more states and regions into this risky logic. The question repeatedly asked is 'who will be next?' and giving any reason to the rhetorical production of *likeness* with Iraq is a course that others — Syria, Iran, Pakistan — now are on guard to avoid.

Critical voices have also asked, why Iraq, specifically? Part of the answer seems to lie in the Kuwait conflict of 1990—1 and the mechanism that exists in the UN Resolution 687 (1991) and the subsequent resolutions, most notably 1441 of November 8, 2002. This mechanism made it possible, in the aftermath of '9—11', to put the stress on Iraq and make this a test case for the credibility of the world body and the international community. Although Iraq's non-compliance with the Security Council Resolutions had been a nuisance for a decade's time, it became a major problem only after the events in September 2001, which also coincided with regime change in the US.

The need to maintain the credibility of the world community which the Security Council stands for presents another element of the initial consensus sought with the audience in the Secretary's Davos speech: «Saddam's *naked defiance* also challenges the *relevance and credibility of the Security Council and the world community*. When all 15 members of the Council voted to pass UN Resolution 1441, they assumed a heavy responsibility to put their will behind their words. *Multilateralism cannot become an excuse for inaction*. Saddam Hussein and others of his ilk would like nothing better than to see the world community back away from this resolution, instead of backing it with their solemn resolve» (p. 3, italics added).

Most of us are prepared to accept the high moral value of a global organization, a notion that, with the aura of the early twentieth century idea of progress, connotes equality and enlightened world opinion. The words above are not, however, quite so simple but they convey also the conception that the Security Council is not necessarily a measure of world community; the idea and its instantiation in the regrettably irresolute world body, as the argument goes, are dissociated[17]. Criticising multilateralism proved to be an unhappy choice of words in this connection, and later on the Secretary was careful to emphasise that the coalition against terror does not suggest unilateralism but, on the contrary, is action in the *name* of multilateralism.

Seeking to justify policies by referring to the need to maintain the credibility of the UN and the world community against Saddam's defiance is an inherently controversial argument because at Davos the issue was already about creating support for the US action even if it meant ignoring the Security Council. Critical voices, President Vladimir Putin of Russia among them, were soon to point out that the war is illegal in terms of the concept of community that respects the UN Charter. It is worth noticing that also the American interpretations arguing for the legality of the war have not resorted to the legal meaning of Resolution 1441, but have instead employed arguments that in various ways authorise unilateral action[18]. The seeming paradox of the Davos speech — the claim to act on behalf of and for a world community which the US acts all the same are prepared to undermine — is solved, as already indicated, by dissociating the *idea* of world community from its actual manifestation in the Security Council. The approach is not new but, due to the open disagreement in the Security Council, Iraq 2003

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[17] About the rhetorical strategy of dissociation, see: *Perelman C.* Op. cit. P. 126—137.

[18] Jurisdictionally, the best working (in comparison with the argument of pre-emptive strike in self-defence, for example) seems to have been the reference to the conditions set for the termination of the Gulf War for the defeated party. The key question after the war is whether Saddam's crimes, in terms of this concept, were more than a reluctance to obey unconditionally and, if not, how does the legal concept of proportionate reaction apply in this case.

is already different from the NATO intervention in former Yugoslavia in 1999 without the approval of the Security Council. The Davos speech shows how the historical community suggested for world community is in the US interpretation inherently linked to the ethos and world leadership this country is argued to represent.

The idea of world community, which in its rhetorical strategy of dissociation already is a question of essence, is defined through the evil *nature* of the opposing forces. In answer to a question posed in Davos by the former Archbishop of Canterbury[19], the Secretary notes that «soft power or talking with evil will not work where, unfortunately, hard power is the only thing that works» (p. 8). What is evil by nature can be encountered by only crude force, and today like previously America offers her aid and opposed quality for the help of the world:

Twelve years ago, we helped liberate their country [Kuwait], and then we left. We did not seek any special benefits for ourselves. That is not *the American way*» (p. 1, italics added).

Above we have mainly looked at arguments, in which structures of reality are presented as causal relations although they basically rely on arguments of essence, i.e. actions and events are approached as if they were manifestations of a substance, benevolent or evil. We will now turn to arguments, which by means of examples, illustrations, and models serve to establish structures of reality. These verbal techniques implicate the operation of some overriding rule, law or principle and on this basis project the future and predict the course of events. In the Secretary's speech, this means looking at arguments which ask us to turn our eyes back to recent history and to see that the US has used its power wisely and fairly, i.e. that its 'hard power' has in fact worked for the good of the world. The sentiment receptive to this conclusion lays the basis for the third element (iii) for an initial consensus in the speech.

Looking back to the future

In comparison with the President and the Secretary of Defence, the task of the Foreign Secretary is less about strengthening the American ethos as such. The Davos speech asks people other than Americans to have trust in America. Trust cannot be argued by appealing only to conventional reasoning, but it needs to also evoke the personal experience and feeling (pathos) in the audience. The Secretary wants to remind his European audience that: «it was not soft power that freed Europe. It was hard power. And what followed immediately after hard power? Did the United States ask for dominion over a single nation in Europe? No. Soft power came in the Marshall Plan. Soft power came with American GIs who put their weapons down once the war was over and helped all those nations rebuild. We did the same thing in Japan» (p. 8).

Post-World War II Japan as an example of the success of American policies has similarly been emphasised also by Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz[20]. A reservation to the parallel offered obviously is that Japan, as the prime example of modernization and democratisation in Southeast Asia, in comparison with Iraq represents a very different country and also another time. It can also be noted that the argued moral debt of Europe to America — who «helped to rescue Europe from the tyranny of fascism» — appeals mainly to the experience and sentiment of an audience which represents the generation of the 1950s, the youth of the Cold War then unfolding. Although the Europe of present times should not forget its recent history, it is questionable to what

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[19] A question by George Carey, former Archbishop of Canterbury, concerning whether the US is now relying too much on 'hard' and not enough on the 'soft' power that builds upon common values not only in the West but also across religions.

[20] Interview for Sky News 6.04.2003.

extent there today exist projections of the future in similar terms. The eastern enlargement of the EU and the internalisation of external problems such as immigration and criminality seem now far more significant. By contrast to the understanding frequently expressed by decision-makers and policy think tank personnel in the US, the predominant perception in Europe is that the collapse of the Soviet Union had to do with internal problems and the chain of events leading to this leaves little reason to celebrate the end of the Cold War as a result brought about by in particular American policies.

Other examples used for the normative modelling of the future by the Secretary include Afghanistan (2001), Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia in the Balkans (the events since 1995), and Kuwait (1991). The critical observer can notice that these cases entail very different situations, which for the justification of military intervention invoke the principles of self-defence (Afghanistan), collective security (Kuwait), and peace enforcement with a high NATO profile (the Balkans, Afghanistan)[21]. In rhetorical study a historically sensitive, sceptical argument can be analytically structured by using Stephen Toulmin's version of the classical enthymeme, a two-part structure consisting of a claim and its implicated reason and, in the Toulminian scheme, involving also the question of evidence, underlying assumptions, qualifiers and rebuttals. A rebuttal, for example, is to object to the conclusion that the removal from power of the Taleban regime in Afghanistan in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 demonstrates a US success, specifically; reminding that the US in this case had a relatively easy access to the country because the Russians were there to pave the way, militarily and diplomatically on the spot in Central Asia[22]. A qualification would be that such help could not be counted on in Iraq (the restrained policies of Turkey and Saudi Arabia), and probably will not be available for equivalent conflicts in the Middle East or elsewhere in the world involving Muslim-populated countries. It can also be reminded (counter-evidence) that in Afghanistan, and even more so in Bosnia, Macedonia, and Kosovo, post-conflict re-building was left to burden the rest of NATO and the European Union. The success of the US could be demonstrated in narrow military terms only.

The sceptical argument can be continued by examining how the possibility to claim success for the US operations in fact has been dependent on the participation of others and what this means in terms of a wider notion of world community. Our conclusion in this presentation will have to be more preliminary, only pointing out that the *pathos* of the argument that seeks to appeal to the feeling that recalls similar experience in the past, recent and more distant, does not unambiguously find resonance in the present times. In respect to the quest for a European gratitude in particular, it appeals to the experience of an already older generation. Although it is true that many of the European leaders — like also their US counterparts — in fact are part of this biologically older generation,

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[21] We can continue the list and add also Somalia (1993), in which case the American intervention sought justification on humanitarian grounds, and Panama (1989) and Grenada (1983), in which cases advocating democratic rule was closely linked with US interests in Central America. These cases are interesting because they constitute a series of military interventions by which the trauma of the Vietnam War has already been forgotten in the USA. The Secretary's Davos speech argues also that «disarmament has worked before» and in this connection refers to Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and South Africa — cases which are very special (relating to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the dismantlement of the *apartheid* system) and hence bear little similarity with Iraq.

[22] For this argument I owe thanks to a distinguished colleague, professor Anatoli Utkin from the Institute of US and Canadian Studies, Moscow. The US disregard of Russia in spite of Russia's contribution to help the US carry out its operations in Afghanistan is pointed out also in *Russia and the West After September 11, 2001. Opening a 'Window of Opportunities': Problems and Prospects*, a report prepared by V.V. Zhurkin et al under the auspices of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Moscow, 2002.

in Europe this is no longer the political generation that defines the issues of the day. The international community which the Secretary's speech seeks to evoke in the European audience calls forth images of the post-World War II transatlantic cooperation, and more than in the 'Old Europe' this notion seems to resonate in the 'New Europe', the former eastern Europe now part of NATO and having the structures of a bipolar Europe still fresh in mind. Although the threat perception, which in old high political terms focuses on Russia, no longer seems rational today, joining the historically opposed camp for understandable reasons still appeals to the people for whom life behind the Iron Curtain is a recent and a previously concretely felt reality. It is, however, much more difficult to offer this, already distant feeling to all of Europe with the purpose of legitimating policies *outside* Europe.

The rhetorical means of gaining the support of Western Europe in the Secretary's speech include using the metaphor of marriage: Henry Kissinger, decades ago, wrote a book on the Atlantic alliance, and he called it «The Troubled Partnership». I am told that later Henry had second thoughts about the title when he found that some bookstores were placing it on the shelf reserved for books about marriage counceling. (Laughter.) But maybe the bookstore owners knew what they were doing, because problems with some of our friends across the Atlantic go back a long time, more than two centuries by my count. In fact, one or two of our friends we have been in marriage counceling with for over 225 years non-stop, and yet the marriage is intact, remains strong, will weather any differences that come along because of our mutual shared values (p.2).

It is not difficult to see what the metaphor, which here offers an initial consensus (iv) makes of possible rift and disagreement: a family dispute. The family of «mutual shared values» constitutes an 'inner circle' of the community, and the rule implicated by the metaphor is that family members should not harm their community by making possible disruption an issue outside this community. The fact that France and Germany were not afraid to express their opposition to the US has been a major blow to the trust thus proposed, and the suggested diplomatic sanctions for those who do not unquestionably support US policies has revealed the ideological domination inbuilt in the idea of marriage. Russia and China in turn are not part of the inner circle but belong to the 'club' on account of their weight in world politics. An initial consensus (v), which calls for the support of Russia and China, reminds the audience that America has supported Russia's full membership in the G-8 and also the country's membership on commercial terms in the World Trade Organization, and that the US also welcomes the development where China — as President Bush already on another occasion had emphasised — is «on its rising path». America acknowledges the ambitions of these states and supports them on their *way* towards being among the major world political actors. This means also that the 'great power realist', which was George W. Bush's proposed policy profile during the presidential campaign, is now limited to these types of relations that, in the realist sense, mean encountering another concentration of state power.

The speech held on the eve of the war shows how the world community proposed by the Bush government is only marginally an historical community of states and international organizations; it is, in the first place, an *ideational* community. Policy choices are not argued by referring to the conventional rules and practices which are brought up when we ask for what cause, under what circumstances, under whose mandate military force can be used in international conflict situations. Instead, the achievement seen in past US interventions is projected into the future and a story of the progressive development of the community is being told on this basis. The «great crusade» — these words are

actually used — is about the generation of wealth for «every one of God's children» (p. 7). The American mission is to disseminate the country's example. This means also that the *demonstration of success*, rather than jointly recognized rules, becomes the social capital for sustained action and the basis for the legitimacy of American policies. As already emphasised, showing success in this conflict is far more complicated than in equivalent cases during the past decade because it has not now been possible to *design* success as a military control of the situation only. Generation of wealth and prosperity are ideational goals, and the success of the operations can be argued in terms of only the *intentions* and the *direction* of the process, for which the historical mission to demonstrate to the world «the American way» (p. 1), the global potency of the American model of democracy and pluralist society, provides justification: *«governments striving to do right* must have good reasons to count on other members of the world community to help them through the rough times to the point where democracy and development are stable and self-sustaining» (p. 5—6, italics added).

It is also worth noticing that *trust*, which semantically frames the agenda in Davos, in the speech helps to build the dualistic world of opposed forces. The governments «striving to do right» should be able to count on the support of other members of the world community (who in this way are called on to participate in the idea of the proposed community). Saddam Hussein and his regime in turn «have repeatedly violated the trust of the United Nations, his people and his neighbours, to such an extent as to pose a grave danger to international peace and security» (p. 2).

Although the credibility of the UN and the threat posed by Saddam's weapons are major concerns in the speech these are not the elements which unfold the *logos* of world community in the rhetorical situation of the speech. In our analytical scheme the logos is the content, semantic and discursive, which the speaker, taken the presumed sentiment of the audience, seeks as a shared domain of reasoning with the audience. Identified by the three aspects of the rhetorical situation, the logos of the speech asks us to trust in America by proposing a specific discursive notion of the good which American involvement in this conflict is argued to bring to the world. This notion can be identified through two intertwined discourses, which shortly can be called 'geopolitics of culture' and the American mission to disseminate democracy and prosperity. Here, neo-Wilsonian idealist liberalism intertwines with a defence of a 'civilizational' project which, in its dualistic world, can well be argued to make the Huntingtonian idea of the Clash of Civilizations a policy concept[23]. Arguably we have here one more version of the *idealist* realism that in the post-World War II era has characterized the globalist (as against the more isolationist) orientation of American foreign policy[24].

The Secretary's speech argues by presenting a pattern of American military involvement in world affairs since World War II. In the aftermath of this major break-up in world politics, the progressive spirit of development had its paradigmatic examples in W.W. Rostow's theory of the stages of economic development, which defined the path to self-sustained maturity, and the parallel approaches outlining political modernization. The paradigmatic way of thinking according to which development is a question of bridging the defined gaps by means of an imitative process in which the developing party assumes the qualities

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[23] *Huntington S.P.* The Clash of Civilizations // Foreign Affairs. 1993. Vol. 72. № 3; Idem. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. N. Y.: Simon & Schuster, 1996.

[24] About the Neo-Wilsonian policies, see: *Hirsh M.* Bush and the World // Foreign Affairs. 2002. September/October; Kegley C.W. The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths and the New International Realities // International Studies Quarterly 1993. Vol. 27. № 2. P. 131—146.

of the modelling party is also today the Bush government's way of thinking about gaining membership in the international community, although the content of the process of democratisation is already more multifarious and sensitive also to cultural identities. The 'developmentalist' way of thinking, which calls for and justifies removing the 'obstacles' represented by traditional and authoritarian elements, however does not today retain all its previous confidence in the progressive movement of history. Rather, the mission today is the *defence of a culture* by seeking to 'secure the world' not only for democracy but also, in the more comprehensive and ideational sense, for prosperity and liberalist rights. This 'civilizational' mission divides the world into 'its' camp and the camp opposed to it, and makes this difference with Manichean religious undertones that previously have not been similarly overt in American external policies. Geopolicy meets modernization, national interest the argued world interest, and the idea of progress is subordinate to the emphasis of order and stability. In this discursive context, the 'hard' military power is required to remove the obstacles represented by forces hostile to westernisation and, in this way, to create the conditions amenable for the desired course and direction of world community. The reason to trust in America with which the Secretary's speech seeks to persuade us reveals this logos, reason and 'word', as the message to which we in the speech ultimately are asked to adhere. To trust means to trust the idea and intention on the basis of the argued record and *not to mind so much* about the circumstantial issues which raise questions about the specific conditions of legitimate intervention[25].

The American 'arrogance' has its immanent explanation in the habitual basis of external relations in the thinking according to which America's 'manifest destiny'[26] is to disseminate its model of democracy and pluralist society — the specific historical concept of multicultural democracy — as a model for the wider world. The domestic analogy makes the rules of inter-state conduct only secondary. This helps also to see why, although the evidence for making the case against Saddam becomes a crucial point in seeking to convince in particular the international audience, this evidence is not primarily about the actual occurrence of events that subsequently would be argued to constitute a crime. Rather, it is about the character and the intentions of the prosecuted, about the types of qualities that, by definition, make a criminal in moral terms and predict a future threat. In other words, when the international audience is called on to give a verdict like a jury, it is called on also to share the prosecutor's conception of the just and the right[27].

Whilst the US government in the Secretary's speech deals with world politics on the macro level of 'civilizational' defence and world order, rhetorical analysis shifts the focus onto the rhetorical situation and the agency that produces this type of discourse. This focus does not, as such, prejudice the interpreter against the possibility of sharing knowledge and experience with the producer of the discourse. It says only that without seeing how thought is relative to the position of speaking we let the discourse 'naturalise' the world for us and risk participating in a discourse which emerges from someone else's experience and on this basis serves to define ours. The question of avoiding dogmatic knowledge has in the

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[25] In the more specific sense 'trust' means leaving oneself vulnerable to the misuse of the 'trusting relationship' by the other party. See: *Hoffman A. M.* A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations // European Journal of International Relations. 2002. Vol. 8, № 3. P. 375—401. 'Confidence' in turn arguably involves self-interest in the sense that it anticipates a desired outcome.

[26] The argument of 'manifest destiny' emerged towards the end of the nineteenth century and then laid the basis for the US expansion in its southern 'backyard' (Mexico and Central America).

[27] The dualistic world of justice relates also to what in the more specific and popular sense has been referred to as the 'cowboyish' features of the Bush administration's way of making world politics.

history of western thought many types of answers, and the proposition of this presentation is to examine the extent to which the universal audience of the speaker (the relational reason of the speech) resonates with the actual audience which includes ourselves, i.e. whether the rhetorical situation is, in fact, ours and applies also to our experience. The final chapter discusses this point and shows also how the notion of critical analysis, which in this presentation applies to policy, is equally well fitted to a critique of the *episteme* of modern science for which the characterizing feature is that it poses questions and seeks answers independently of context[28].

The audience which for the Secretary's speech is the unspecified, universal audience of reasoning minds may be identified in the three aspects of classical rhetoric and examined in these different but mutually intertwined emphases, which each call forth a type of actual, in time and place specified audience. Outside the US, the American *ethos* appeals to those who believe in 'the American way' and its symbolic value for the rest of the world. Here, the US can be an icon not only of military and economic but also of cultural power, and the actual audience incorporates those for whom the US in one or another way is a model way of life[29]. While ethos refers back to itself (i.e. there is no further justification to something like a way of life), *pathos* seeks to evoke the feeling and experience that provides 'proof' to this idea. The aspect of pathos, which in the Secretary's speech seeks support for the idea that America's military intervention in the world's conflicts is claimed to stand for, addresses an audience which is typically a past generation. In a very concrete sense this generation, however, continues to be present in the Bush administration. I am referring to the present-day position of such 'old-timers' as Donald Rusmsfeld (previously President Nixon's adviser), Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz, and the continued influence of practitioner-theorists such as Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger. We are hardly the first to point out that the combined influence of neo-conservationism and the emergence of new, unprecedented threats in the US explains something of the situation in which past experience provides answers also to new problems[30].

The aspect of *logos* proposes an argument and a domain of discourse which brings together the two other aspects. The logos of the speech unfolds itself as a reasoning by which the Americans in seeking the leadership in the post-World War II era and now, in the wake of '9–11', with new emphases have been drawing the normative boundaries of world and international community. As witnessed by the controversies that were soon to flare up in the Security Council over the interpretation of the issue, the Secretary's ideal audience of reasoning minds who would be ready to join the US in bringing action against Saddam could not easily meet the actual international audience. But whilst the idea of evidence for an 'international outlaw' in most cases is too specifically American to convince the wider world audience, the more general argument of threat would seem to appeal to those whose institutional and professional modes of argumentation conventionally involve the idea of America's leadership and capability to point solutions to the world's problems. Such groups are, for example, the business people who think in terms of the relative advantage brought about by the expansion of western influence and the stabilisation of political conditions for a market economy, and the actual

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[28] *Toulmin S.* Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990.

[29] In the same way as Diners' Club stands for a community in international business and IBM or Microsoft for technological superiority, precision bombing is an icon of military eminence and professional excellence.

[30] Conservationism is political conservatism in the specific sense that it refers to the attempt to preserve and restore previous ways and images.

soldiers and diplomats whose corresponding concerns are strategic and geopolitical for reasons that are both global and regional.

The question which specifically interests us is how does the logos of the speech address the IR student, for whom a shared domain of reasoning is offered through notions about self-sustaining democracy and development, leadership and world order, the dualistic ontology of world politics, and so on — offered not in the notions as such but, rather, in the mechanisms of articulating world political problems and important foci for research. These mechanisms, which are not always explicit and exist as an effect of 'scientific socialization', are constitutive of the shared framework of knowledge of which Richard Rorty with reference to the communicative process of research speaks as the *epistemological moment*. This concept shifts the focus from the content of policy to the knowledge that informs and sustains it.

In the background of the Diplomat and the Soldier there is a whole machinery of professional advice, policy think tank work and intelligence reports. Although we, as IR students, do not have access to the corridors of power where this knowledge and information becomes operative for policy purposes, we are invited to share these frameworks of knowledge when reading a work by Brzezinski or the articles in *Foreign Affairs*, or when we have the opportunity in our *International Studies Association* meetings to listen to people versed in the foreign relations discourses of the major power, discourses which are supportive and often also critical of the governmental policies. American IR, in particular, renders possible this participation for reasons that relate to the openness of discussion and the mere volume of the research community, and an additional reason for the open display of policy discourse is the interplay of academe and policy think tank tasks in individual career structures in the US. To be able to participate in this discourse from the 'outside' is a privilege, but it means also that we like our American colleagues learn to think of the US as being always at the centre of world political problems, even if we simultaneously are critical of the state of affairs thus described. Our world political imagination more often than not depicts this country at the top of the pyramidal power structure, as the hegemonic power, and in various ways being the centre of world policy. Stanley Hoffmann (1977) is among the first to have recognized this problem in American IR[31], and the critical scholarship of the present day has chosen to deal with the issue by turning to an entirely different research interest ('The Zen of IR')[32].

E.H. Carr's point about the relativity of thought, which emphasises the particular interest and specific historical context in ways of thinking, can be used to remind us how the discipline that seeks to be 'international' in fact can be also parochial in the sense that it does not recognize its own 'Rashomon condition', the situation which makes argument a perspective only. The problem of alienation present in universalist normative principles and notions of objectivity of knowing has in many different ways been reflected on in critical social science and philosophy. Rorty's *hermeneutical moment* frees us from the presumption of a shared framework on the basis of which communication can proceed, and consequently sets us free also from the predominance of logos in the sense of the logic of scientific inference (*episteme*). Thinking of the analytical scheme of this study, the hermeneutical moment brings back into our research communication the two other aspects, pathos and

[31] *Hoffmann S.* An American Social Science: International Relations // International Theory: Critical Investigations. L.: Macmillan, 1995. P. 212–241; See also: *Alker H.R. and Biersteker T.* The Dialectics of World Order: Notes for a Future Archeologist of International Savoir Faire // International Theory: Critical Investigations. L.: Macmillan, 1995. P. 242–276.

[32] The paradigmatic example is: The Zen of International Relations: IR Theory from East to West / Ed. by S. Chan, P. Mandaville and R. Bleiker. Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001.

ethos. These remind us that the activity of research involves also sentiment based on personal experience and a normative orientation to the world. Following the Aristotelian distinction, our mode of knowing is *phronesis*, a form of reasoning which deals with what is variable (vis-a-vis the invariable of episteme) and always involves a mediation between the universal (the ideational aspect of a thing) and the particular situation calling for deliberation and choice[33]. In our pragmatist approach to rhetoric, the universal is mediated in the particularity of the perspective as the intentionality of the communicative act which, in its content, is relative to a position of speaking and *relational* in the sense of its potentiality for dis/agreement with other perspectives. This potentiality exists on the basis of the logic of language that can communicate experience and the experience that, by means of the language (not necessarily verbal), can be identified as similar and isomorphic.

In the problem formulation of this study, an hermeneutical moment which in a communicative relationship to the content of the Secretary's speech dissents from its logos can be unfolded in the three aspects of rhetoric, which each bring forth a point of departure for dis/agreement. For example for a person like myself, coming from the remote, peaceful corner of Europe which the Nordic countries represent and, moreover, from a country with no problem of political Islam (Finland), it is alarming news (pathos) that Norway, because of the country's involvement in Afghanistan, now also finds herself on the al-Qaida list of targets. The feeling that brings the threat so near — near my home and anybody's home — connects with reasoning (logos) entirely different from the Secretary's: By drawing more of the world into the logic which effectively globalises the threat, the cure which the American policies offer to the problem of terrorism in fact seems to increase the severity of the illness. Increased suicide bombings in the Middle East, including Iraq, offer another illustration, and one striking aspect of such 'backlashes' is the present-day situation where many of the fighters who now are loyal to Osama bin Laden were also the warriors who in Afghanistan fought the Soviets with the help of the CIA. While Zbigniew Brzezinski argues that the CIA manoeuvres in Afghanistan were effective in bringing down the Soviet Union, we can add that they also helped to instigate another worldwide conflict and hence, similarly in hindsight, cast in doubt America's credibility for responsible world leadership[34].

It is not difficult to notice that the ethos of world community I would like to advocate seeks policy options that do not participate in the dualistic logic but, instead, try to increase the intellectual and political space for alternative ways of encountering the problem of terrorism and diminishing the threat. These options include policies of non-alignment and participation with only humanitarian concerns, as well as the more overtly critical stand of 'leaving an empty seat' — to metaphorically refer to the act of the Arab Republic of Syria, the only dissenting opinion when the US in the Security Council vote of May 22, 2003, received an

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[33] *Phronesis* is a form of reasoning appropriate to *praxis*; a type of appeal to truth which (by contrast to *episteme*) deals with what is variable and in time and place involves mediation between the universal and the particular. See, for example: *Bernstein R. J.* Beyond Objectivism and Relativism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983. P. 144—150.

[34] Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, formerly President Jimmy Carter's National Security Adviser, in 'Le Nouvel Observateur' (France), January 15—21, 1998, p. 76. An English-language version with the title 'Ex-National Security Chief Brzezinski admits: Afghan Islamism Was Made in Washington' is available at http://emperors-clothes.com/interviews/brz.htm. In 1998, Brzezinski argues: «What is most important to the history of the world? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some stirred-up Moslems or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the cold war?» It can also be noticed that the CIA (as the reporter and war correspondent John Pilger has also pointed out) helped the Baath party to power, among other things providing Saddam Hussein the weaponry he requested. The US is also responsible for providing, during the late 1980s, Iraq with bacteriological and chemical samples of which BC weapons materials could be cultivated (72 separate shipments, according to the sources of the US Senate).

overwhelming majority to support her initiative for lifting the sanctions in Iraq, and to consequently gain virtually free hands in rebuilding this country and its oil industry until the still unforeseeable establishment of a national regime. It is only common reason to argue that the political leadership in no country should risk the security of the population for reasons of showing solidarity in conflicts the dynamism of which in many ways remains unknown to them. Some may call this an already anachronistic national realism, but I would like to think of it also as an international and global ethic. Immanuel Kant's Prince, for whom war is «a game alike a hunting trip», tends to be present in also the elitist solidarity and professional 'me-tooism' for which the people pay with ruined lives, as also Kant argued in his *Zum Ewigen Frieden.* This ethical position calls for no great design but is only a way to survive and to 'muddle through' (to paraphrase British realism) the complexities of the time.

Of course, considerations are not quite so simple when a country already finds itself in the sphere of significant terrorist activity, either as a target or as an infrastructure for international activity. However, seeking to control these situations is not synonymous with the signs of solidarity that make other countries targets for the 'hatred of America', a syndrome which in all cases is far more complicated than is suggested by dealing with it using hard military means can suggest. The situation is psychologically especially difficult in countries like Japan, who, partly because of anxieties relating to present regional tension (North Korea), feel obliged to show the gratitude Secretary Powell asks for. In these policy dilemmas the classical realist circumstantial judgement (prudence) means considering to what extent the participation in the global conflict argued by the US leads the country away from its more immediate concerns and the world political identity perhaps more beneficial in the longer run. In Chandigarh I came across an editorial which argued that in her present arms build-up, India ignores the everyday security needs of her vast population and that the policy line, which means also ignorance of the country's human potential as a national resource, is not credible in front of the international community whose help the country continuously needs (although this does not mean an already anachronistic and also previously simplistic 'third world' image)[35]. This reasoning reminds us of the actual power which normative argument ('soft power') can have in international relations in the sense that sharing internationally authorised norms and participation in this normative discourse can also increase the governmental capacity for solving nationally and regionally acute problems[36]. Speaking of India in particular, the important question is how to prevent the globalisation of the problem of terrorism from offering easy political capital for the conflict over Kashmir and the ethnic tensions in the country and its relations with Pakistan.

There is, however, also another level for the search of alternative ways. A more fundamental critique than the dissenting logic that seeks a *third way* would seem to be to point *a way out* from the dualistic ontology that sustains the threat perception. Although the Bush administration has repeatedly emphasised that its war is not with the Muslim world[37], it all the same plays the game of *opposed substance*, which logically invites this opposition. Opposed

[35] *Kumar K.* We All Fall Down // The Times of India. 2003. March 6.

[36] This argument about the 'internationalisation of political authority' has been made by Alexander Wendt. Wendt's notion is an argument against the simplistic 'sovereignty at bay' conception, see: *Wendt A.* Identity and Structural Change in International Politics // The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory. L.: Lynne Rienner, 1996. P. 47–64.

[37] The Bush administration's attempt not to approach al-Qaida as a symbol for the Muslim world is not unproblematic because, as a number of observers have also pointed out, the terrorist organization's main specifying characteristic in relation to the Muslim world in the wider sense is its reliance on violence.

155

substance was also the game of Saddam, who urged his soldiers to «slain the barbarians at the gates of Baghdad»[38]. Most importantly, the hermeneutical moment in the world political situation today involves communicating to the US that this game does not exist as a shared framework for knowledge and action. One aspect of this communication is the criticism of the ontology of substance which in the history of western metaphysics has its primary example in God. This criticism would among other things need to focus on the uses of the image of God for simplistic projections of the 'real' in dualistic substance (often also anthropomorphised substance; like in fairy tales, evil and benevolence take shape in concrete beings). In this task, the scholar's tools include ontology of existence (as against substance), deconstruction, genealogy, historicity, etc. But rather than all this I have in mind a contribution from the world's non-Christian religions, including Islam. The quest is for intellectuals, including the clerical thinkers and scholars, to bring their critical views to forums at which world community can take shape, and for these forums, global and inter-regional, to invite reflections on the concrete meaning of world community. The Bush administration has now presented its answer to the question of how this community transcends the boundaries of the traditional community of nation-states, and it is urgent that there within authorised institutional frames are reflections that transcend also this dualistic logic, even if it in many cases is not possible to take such reflections as performative statements by the institutions in question[39].

I am not among those who would argue that hard military power cannot work for the good of the world. For example, the UN weapons inspections seemed to have been facilitated by the presence of US and British armaments in the area[40]. But as the war in Iraq also shows, letting hard military power predominate the course of events means an impatient logic of action that needs to rationalise its mistakes afterwards. After the war, a whole machinery has been set up by the coalition in order to *retroactively establish the facts which would justify the war.* We have already referred to the hypothetical argument that Saddam destroyed his weapons of mass destruction shortly before the war, or that he at least — as (re)found documents are argued to indicate — had *intentions* to develop such weapons. With the weakening plausibility of such reasoning, and under the pressures of the scandals relating to the exaggerated and even transformed intelligence information, the humanitarian cause has been lifted up as the justification for the war. The humanitarian task, again, provides a seemingly uncontroversial justification for sending soldiers, now from an increasing number of also non-western states, to participate in Iraq's post-war build-up. Non-aligned Finland is not among these countries but it, too, participates in the post-war phase by sending aid material and also a medical team to investigate Saddam's mass graves. This last-mentioned mission means using the expertise which Finland had developed earlier in Bosnia, and on this basis the task has been presented in Finland as purely humanitarian. However, the issue is not quite so simple. Unlike in Bosnia, the mission in Iraq is not to help to identify the missing hundreds and thousands of people and thus to help the Iraqis to cope with their losses. Rather, it is by means of a

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[38] Saddam Hussein's speech of 12 January 2003, on the Army Day to commemorate the twelfth anniversary of the Gulf War.

[39] This point can be taken as an attempt to strengthen 'global civil society' — although I would like to add that this notion already gives it a specific discursive content and that the ethical and pragmatic foundations of 'being international' can be also different.

[40] This effect has been recognized by Hans Blix, chief of UN weapons inspections in Iraq, in an interview in early June in 2003 (BBC World News, June 7, 2003).

limited sample to investigate bone marrow material and in this way to find possible evidence of the use of BC weapons in the uprisings that occurred during the time of the Gulf War (1991). It does not require much imagination to see that genocide prosecutions are now thought to compensate for the failure to demonstrate the evidence for the alleged existence, in 2003, of the weapons of mass destruction that would constitute an imminent threat to the world. I regret that also my country participates in the tasks that ultimately serve the coalition's political purposes and contribute to the ex post facto rationalisation of the war in the public eye of the world.

The folly of our time (to paraphrase Raymond Aron) seems to be that America is tragically trapped in a logic in which it continuously needs to demonstrate success, and needs to do so because this over all else is the country's way of justifying her policies for the domestic and also for the world audience. Whilst Tony Blair finds himself in severe difficulties when it seems that the British population was misled by his government, George W. Bush appears to be much better able to slip away from such accusations by simply presenting himself as the leader who took responsibility for removing a global threat. In America, this argument is sustained by the habitual notions relating to the country's world political role — the belief in the 'manifest destiny'— and a continuous flow of the signs of success is needed to keep the tradition alive. The need to constantly reconfirm the idea of America in this way is, indeed, a tragic trap, tragic for America and also for the entire world. This syndrome (of an *Abendland,* if you wish) and its combination with the problem of terrorism is clearly one of the greatest dangers of the post-Cold War time, and is so also for the reason that it strengthens the tendency in which the world is increasingly an arena for American domestic politics. In this sense the argumentative discourse I have emphasised is not only an alternative ethos; it is, rather, a practical necessity for trying to redirect this hazardous course.

The pragmatist approach advocated in this study follows the argument that it is not very fruitful to reason about international and world community in the sense that looks for universally valid criteria for legitimate intervention — and E.H. Carr, once again, reminds us about how such rules risk becoming tools for pursuing particular interests. I have emphasised the importance of institutional discourse within frames that are other than the US-led coalition, frames that are regional and also inter-regional, such as the Non-Aligned Movement. This is because the notions of community, which emerge in such institutional discourse, are also constitutive statements (performative speech acts) of that specific historical community. In the same vein of argument, the hard question for America is how the people on behalf of whom the intervention is thought to be can also, in a concrete sense, be part of the 'we' in the intervening community[41]. America needs to start looking for answers on grounds other than the defined idea of the Other provided by the American mission and its

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[41] Discussing legitimate humanitarian intervention, Alex J. Bellamy argues that the people on behalf of whom the intervention is thought to be should, in some concrete sense (i.e. not on abstract grounds such as common humanity), be part of the 'we—group'. Although the point is well taken, Bellamy's 'pragmatic solidarism' does not question on what criteria the argued solidarity is a performative representing international community, i.e. argument and sentiment are not problematised in relation to the institutional preconditions that provide international legitimacy to actions (although this legitimacy need not, as Bellamy also emphasizes, be outlined in universalist terms). In this way, 'pragmatist solidarism' can, in fact, in the name of 'multiperspectivalism' serve to legitimize unilateral meaning-production such as the Secretary's discussed in this study, see: *Bellamy A.J.* Pragmatic Solidarism and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention // Millennium: Journal of International Studies. 2002. Vol. 31. № 3. P. 473—497.

projection of the American model of pluralist society and multicultural democracy for the rest of the world[42]. Clearly, the factual situation now is such that the 'we'-group in the Iraqi conflict is emphatically the coalition and its supporters — a situation that is guaranteed to deepen the dualist reality which is at the root of the problem.

Аннотация

Автор статьи «Мировое сообщество как разумное сообщество? Ретроспективный анализ дипломатического обоснования Иракской войны» предпринимает критический разбор публичных выступлений политиков по поводу Иракского кризиса не с точки зрения реалистической теории международных отношений, отражающей зачастую специфически американский опыт международной политики, но с позиций эпистемологии и «риторического поворота», предлагающего особую технику анализа публичных выступлений (см.: «Новая риторика» Ч. Перельмана). С этой позиции мировое сообщество выступает как «универсальная аудитория», в которой в постоянном диалоге состоят политики и общество; первые представляют «сторону говорящего» (актора), вторые — «сторону слушающего» (агента). Обращение актора к агенту строится по правилам классической риторики: его первая часть (этос) раскрывает намерения говорящего; вторая часть (пафос) — направлена на пробуждение ответного чувства у слушающего; третья часть (эмблема) — воспроизводит яркие примеры, призванные убедить слушающего. В качестве образца взята «Девосская речь» Госсекретаря США, обосновывающая право США на применение силы против Ирака. Соединенные Штаты выступают от лица всего мирового сообщества и в интересах его блага. Америка уже спасала Европу от фашизма и коммунизма, Европа должна испытывать чувство долга перед Америкой. Америка более ответственно оценивает современные процессы на Востоке и в Европе, в частности восточное расширение ЕС, влекущее за собой проблемы нерегулируемых миграций, в том числе из стран Востока, криминогенности, международного терроризма. С американской точки зрения, Европа недооценивает угрозу либеральным ценностям со стороны Ирака и других мусульманских стран, дающих прибежище террористам.

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[42] It can also be noticed that the Achilles' heel of the American model, the sore point that makes the abstract model concrete and historical, is the question of the treatment of domestic minorities in major conflict situations. The Muslim population in the US is not now treated like the Japanese in the US after Pearl Harbour, but the case is also not the same as the treatment of the Germans in America (no sanctions) after the gunning down of Lucitania, the event that prompted the US participation in World War I. The Germans more than the Japanese and the Muslims were part of 'us' in the US. I owe thanks to prof. Osmo Apunen, University of Tampere, for pointing out these historical facts to me.