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**M. HEIDEGGER'S "DASEIN" CONCEPT AND THE PROBLEM
OF SCIENTIFIC CONSCIENCE HISTORICITY**

SUMMARY. The paper highlights M. Heidegger's concept "Da-sein" with its key theoretical and methodological notions to the problem historical science.

KEY WORDS. Historicity, "dasein", Husserl, Heidegger, Gadamer, perception philosophy, hermeneutics.

At his time E. Husserl explained historicity as "a consciousness horizon" limiting cognition by modernity, by the "point Now". It means that there is a wall between the present and the past, and historicity of 'I' outlines the irresistible limits of cognition: the past is closed for us forever and cannot be explored. [1].

In H-G. Gadamer's *Truth and Method* (1959) the problem of historicity was transferred to humanitarian sciences and got fundamental and methodological notion. He said: "Should historical dependency of consciousness be a barrier in historical knowledge?" Could there be "the knowledge, achieving objectivity?" [2; 280-281] As we can see, the historicity of consciousness challenges the relevance of liberal research: it makes us doubt that the 'truth', found by philosophers, historians, philologists in the texts of the past is important for science [3; 39-40].

Indeed, the historicity of scientific consciousness urges to admit that the events of the past are impossible to explore, and the challenges of the existence of the notion "science" and all its results will be called 'subjective' in advance. A researcher's historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) and his aim which is a historical identity of the past (Historizität) are contradicting. The conscience historicity means that a man thinks 'from now' and the past events cannot be explored in their 'historical', 'objective' notion. It is known that M. Heidegger solved the problem of historicity and wrote about it in his book *Being and Time* (1927). He highlights not ego, but 'Dasein', which is free of apriority. Historicity is interpreted as 'a basic way of human being', which does not preface any transcendental structure. Subjectivity as 'the first' scientific basis was disproved: "dasein" means 'being-in-the-world', occurring existentially, in experiential comprehension of a man who is not subjectively but existentially oriented. History is the history of Being, which is higher than all the attempts of a subject conscience to explore philosophical and scientific truth.

Historicity remains a consciousness horizon, which limits its abilities, yet indicates not the barriers of historical experience but the need of a new thinking of 'truth and method' for liberal sciences. Performing 'the rise from historicity to a hermeneutical principle', H-G. Gadamer explored historicity as a 'condition

of comprehension' and defined its methodologically productive connotations in the relation to the experience of art, history and philosophy. For this he used M. Heidegger's description of 'comprehension pre-structure' that helped him to prove 'tradition', 'legend' as a basis of 'moral sciences' which implies truth and ability of historical comprehension.

Exploring contradiction between Heidegger's and Husserl's concept, H-G. Gadamer notes: 'World is still important, indeed, in the existential abolishment of the scientific thinking' because 'theoretically-cognitive consciousness which puts a question of apriority is not drastic enough' [2]. V. Molchanov supposes: 'It is typical that for Heidegger the subjectivity of conscience as a basis and a central sphere of philosophy was the main point of repulsion' from Husserl's concept' [4]. Not a subject, not 'clear cogito', but 'unjustified and uncalculated presence of being, existentialism' is a new 'basis of phenomenal question raising' [2; 305] Gadamer highlights that the word 'presence' (die Faktizität) was taken as a vivid antonym, a word, opposite to notion of conscience and spirit in German idealism or a Husserl's transcendental Ego' [5, 58]. Heidegger criticized notion 'I' as apriori for science; by that a question of its bases was brought again. The aim of this issue is to search this problem on historicity level of "Dasein", and this is a central notion of M. Heidegger's philosophy.

In his book *Being and Time* M. Heidegger defines 'ontological difference' between the 'Reality' which is a subject of cognition and 'Being'. In his *European Nihilism* he notes that the 'basis' of the whole ontology and metaphysics is a notion of ontological difference' [6; 152]. Taking into account this difference which 'drastically challenges the whole ontology, what is metaphysics' resulted in the following: subjective conscience 'I' cannot be the 'first' for science and cannot be its basis, since there is 'Being' which is over any subjectivity and any empirical 'I'. A man is already not "ego" and not "I", but "Dasein" that is a human conscience depends on "Being".

With that, Heidegger does not make a new basis but reconstructs it; it is not "being", but 'a difference between being and reality'. In Gadamer's opinion, subjectivity power is cancelled by „Being“ in scientific thinking in order not to set a new apriori construction 'instead of' a previous one, since rBeing“ is read through time and like Time“ [7; 103], what prevents it from transformation into 'a priori' and unchangeable structure of conscience. That is what Heidegger tells about the 'apriori' notion: 'Still apriori, which is correctly understood as prior, for the first time discovers its *temporary* nature in a narrower sense of the rTime“, which the contemporaries do not want to see, because they do not see a hidden link between being and time' [6; 157] It's time to clear up how the problems of scientific cognition are presented within concept of being as rtime“.

Being happens 'historically', within the 'time of history; historicity category ('finiteness') also losses its apriority and describes a man's specific place in the Being. 'Finiteness is not a property given us, writes Heidegger in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, but a fundamental method of our Being. If we want to be what we are, we cannot remove this finiteness and deceive it, we should save it' [6; 331]. This approach means that the being of a human (Dasein) is conscience. In Gadamer's opinion 'The essence of hermeneutics presence is that there must be a comprehension in the very fact of being and that this is a hermeneutic being' [8; 59].

"Being" for a human in his 'finiteness', 'sacral focus on the end', [6; 331] is not 'the object' of comprehension but the condition supporting this comprehension: a human 'is present in Being' and can understand the power of the 'presence'. It means that not the man explores Being, but Being explores and performs itself. The notion of Heidegger's Being is a Greek 'fusus', 'self-creation, self-developing, self-actualizing' [6; 155-156].

The Reality, i.e. the 'cognition subject', 'is characterized by being in a sense of "fusus", so, the comprehension of Being must be a philosopher's and every intellectual's aim. Since historicity, 'finiteness' will close access to the 'truth of Being', its comprehension is possible only if a human 'listens to the call' of Being, what is impossible while using subjective concept. The link between a human and Being is performed 'historically, within history'. So, to comprehend Being without subjectivity we have to search its link with history.

M. Heidegger uses Husserl's 'historicity' concept as the basic notion for his idea. In his work *European Nihilism* it is said: "Does comprehensive exploration of history exist? Does any human interpret it in his *own* way? ". These questions are rather rhetorical as we can see from the following: "We too have to interpret a previous idea in our own way. We can get out of history and 'time' no more than Nietzsche or Hegel to see the reality from some absolute point" [6; 103-104].

For Heidegger the historicity of scientific thinking becomes a real barrier. He wrote: "We will permanently stumble into a barrier, coming from the concept, which nowadays became commonplace: every search in history is characterized by the present and refers to it" [6; 105]. But the fact that 'historicity' became 'commonplace' and almost a maxim does not accept 'subjectivity' since 'in accepting subjectivity' 'the advantage of a subject that makes all the past work for the present' will occur again.

Heidegger's 'real' need is to understand historicity of human being. Here comes the problem of 'history' and our interpretation of it. Heidegger shows that history is 'hidden' behind 'historiography' that is the product of subjectivity conscience. "We are likely to imagine a history as a series of events, fixed in historiography". But the facts which are historiographically presented do not predict history, but all the events take place to perform the being" [6; 253-254].

The main point is that we should not treat history 'subjectively'; it means we do not make history, so we cannot explain it through modern theoretical concepts only.

History occurs 'itself', in other words, it was 'given by Being'. 'The main events are circumstances which occur on a way to a historical event' [6; 253]. Heidegger underlines: "We are not experienced and thoughtful enough to realize the essence of history through reference, mission, and its fulfillment. We limit history by frames of the present, instead of comprehending it according to its real origin". The word 'event' (Ereignis) gets the following notional connotation: "The Event is given us by Being, provided that Being comes true and changes with the Event".

So, history is comprehended not through 'a process', but through 'the event' and 'reference'. It would seem that historicity and 'a horizon of the present' blocks the way to 'the event'. But now it seems clear that our typical interpretation of time as 'a process' disturbs us. To put it into question, M. Heidegger brings into focus

Husserl's idea of 'the point Here'. He writes that calling Present, we think about Past and Future instead of Now. "Time is the unity of Present, Past and Future which is interpreted as a sequence of Now-events". But Heidegger supposes that Future also means presence, and its discussion requires the feeling of place and sedentism" [6; 397-398].

The time, unlike Husserl's idea, is comprehended not through a 'process', but through the 'Presence', and it drastically changes historicity situation, since it clears up the difference of 'horizons': 'the horizon of the present' contains a present idea till it is thought to be a single one. But if the Time for a man is a 'presence by Being', which is always new, it is evident that there were different 'horizons of present' in history then a question of approach to the Past on the basis of not 'our' (subjective) but of 'its' horizon.

How can we overcome the limits of our historicity and enter 'Presence-by-Being'? Heidegger highlights: "Being must be interpreted independent from our historicity (*European Nihilism*) [6; 155]. For this the fourth dimension of time, a special one, is set. Here a new notion of 'Space-Time' is introduced. Time is not three-dimensional, writes Heidegger. "Time itself is four-dimensional", and this fourth dimension is "the first, which defines everything" because "it is present in Future, Past and Present" (*Time and Being*). "The Time of history by that is 'fullness' of human existence, 'the place' of a man 'within' his history: "The events of the history of being were determined by containing openness of this relevance, but not by the impersonal expanse of the historical process [6; 396].

Let us clear now which research perspectives were showed by the interpretation of time, presence and 'place'. First of all, to comprehend Being 'itself', we have to avoid 'overlapping' of our new concepts with the Past. Well, to understand Plato-Greek essence of the 'idea', we have to exclude any link with a new-European definition of the idea as an interpretation and relation between the idea and the 'subject' [6; 156]. We have also to refuse the 'historiographic' approach towards the Past; because "unlike some city or nation being does not have a history". It will bring our idea closer to the situation, where this comprehension work appears, and will make necessary conditions.

Heidegger highlights: "History-likeness of the history of being is usually defined when being occurs", it means "being has a place" such interpretation of history must be substituted by its "historiographic" vision [6; 395]. How can "being have a place" in history? What does differentiate these "places" from one another? First of all, a difference is visible, because the relation to history changed, and it's possible to understand something in case we make the "relation to history" one of the primary steps of the research. Heidegger notes: "Every historical statement and its grounding appear in some relation to the history", and "before making up a decision of historical truth, we have to think whether and how history is felt, how it is basically defined" (*Hegel and Greeks*) [6; 388].

Heidegger's works explain how to differ the "horizons": we have to realize our own relation to them. The way the Past is interpreted depends on "how and where historicity of human being is defined for us" [6; 105]. Heidegger writes: "That is why the question of the truth of the "history image" is wider than the question of the historical truth and usage accuracy and interpretation of sources. It puts a question of truth of our historical placing and of relation to history".

Every history interpretation has different "historical being approaches", every history has its special 'basis' and its search becomes a task stipulated by the historicity of our mind. "Proper speculative constructions and invisible complexity of speculative habits" will disturb it; "Being oblivion" is inertness of the scientific idea, "Posture" as a modern way of historical being" [6; 254]. People do not want to see, because otherwise they would agree that the basis they are building metaphysics on is *not the basis* at all" [6; 157].

The History of Being is "fulfilled" in its inner, invisible logics. Being itself fulfills 'epoch'; it hides its essence, which becomes unexplainable for the modern comprehension. "Holding oneself, tells Heidegger, in Greek means *epoch*. The idea of the history of being comes from here. Here *Epoch* means not a time segment, but the main feature of aptitude, its own holding in favor of content comprehensibility, i.e. the being of creation absorption" [6; 396].

As we see, Husserl's methodological notion gets another notion. 'Epoche', referring to 'epoch', notes some definite period of history, which has a specific "way of historical being". Its essence, different from other 'epochs' is expressed through its 'bases' [9; 421-448]. The three periods of being are defined in Heidegger's works: the period of Classical Greek, the pre-Socrates Epoch; Modern age; modernity and every period have a specific basis. First of all, being as "ousia" which organically includes man; besides, "ousia" is the opposite of being as an "absolute idea". The word 'ousia', as Gadamer supposes, in Greek meant "land property" but not a peasant and his 'thinking' [5; 63]. Secondly, this is the subjectivism that opposes a man to the being according to cogito principle; and the last basis is "posture" as the power of mechanics over humanity "which is not planned yet" and "being oblivion".

Thus, the historicity of our thought requires the 'essence' of creation of one of the epochs to be interpreted through the 'basis' of this epoch and it should be related to it, but not to our idea about this time of history. The 'bases' are movable and not 'given': they are set by the artistic thought of contemporaries, but we have to understand 'how' this thought does it. Heidegger said: "the essence of poetry, set by Hölderlin is highly historical, because it forecasts some historical time. But, as historical essence, it is the only substantial substantiality" [10; 46].

As we see, the essence of writing is not transcendental but historical; because it can be understood through its historical ground only and 'within' its own historical epoch. To express a historical 'singularity' of writing, we have to interpret it as 'eidos of home', indicating "the reality essence that comes to the presence, i.e. to the being ... This is not an aspect for a subject, but a 'view' of the place the reality came from" [6; 156]. 'Home', 'world', and 'ground' are the notions aimed to elicit the rootedness of the 'work of art' within the history as its 'origin' [7; 100-115].

If we try to note the content of the grounds then Heidegger refers to them the types of 'being thinking'. This Plato's 'idea', Aristotle's 'energeia', Kant's 'supposition', Hegel's 'concept', Nietzsche's 'willpower' "are not the occasional practices, but the words of being as the responds to the challenge that sounds in a hidden message, in "being has a place" [6; 396]. Historical basis of Modern Age appears to be prior in relation to any among them. So, it is said that "Hegel feels the essence of history going from being in a sense of absolute subjectivity" before "all right and wrong Hegel's historical statements" (*Hegel and Greeks*) [6; 56].

As we see, the question of being “basis” is asked in philosophy and metaphysics: “The difference between being and reality is the main basis which directs any metaphysical question” [6; 152]. There goes no empirical, no factual sphere of reality which is examined out of its philosophical reflex. That is because the access to the history being is examined in philosophy (the mind of being) only, that is in language, in Logos.

We come again to the problem of our knowledge historicity: the main aim of a modern speculator is to explore historical bases and it faces “the horizon of the Past”. That is why there must be some dimension of our thought, which determines the truth of its results. Sure, it cannot be ‘subjective’ and must carry all previous historical experience in a hidden sanctity. For Heidegger this is language; “Being event” is saved in it. Hölderlin wrote: “History exists only where the World commands. Speech gives a guarantee that a man as a historical individual *can exist*. Speech is not a ready source, but the event (Ereignis), which controls the highest ability of human being” [10; 40].

Language is “a home of being” and its “truth”, “a keeper of presence”, in Logos being comes into presence, so the event can be understood through a language [6; 271]. The ways of such understanding are traced in Heidegger’s works: this is a refuse of theoretical notions and categories of modern science, because they determine a way of thought “beforehand” and cannot change this way, because it is limited by “a horizon of the present”. Metaphorical language of Heidegger is one of the ways to overcome this force.

Examination of the history language makes it possible to face it with “the event” and time. Heidegger wrote: “There is no natural language for it was a language of non-historic, human nature. Every language is historical, even there, where a human became familiar with historiography in a new-European sense” [6; 271]. The nature of the word historicity is determined by its epoch and cannot be understood through the reference to it. “Language as data, in Heidegger’s opinion, is not a language; it is historical according to the sense and limits of this epoch”.

There is always “an essence” in a notion, a sense which is not permanent, but historically changeable. “Essence is a temporal category” [8; 64] for Heidegger, who “was the first after Aristotle” to understand: “our notions are occurring from the words of our language... and capture the time of birth of human experience”. Rethinking of terminologically bound in scientific tradition notions, developed by Heidegger, shows its principally different notions, what is hidden for science, supposing these notions like ‘being’, to be synonymous. Such rethinking will help to understand the works of the past through itself.

“Every language is an interpretation of a human”, underlines Gadamer [8; 66], not ‘our’ interpretation, but ‘its’ own. The way to history as Heidegger says is the way to language: it changes, but saves historical truth, making it available for us. But it happens only in the case if we see Logos in language (Überlieferung).

As Heidegger’s follower, Gadamer refuses “truth” and “method” in an absolute sense. Logos remains to be “a sample” of science and the truth in research of historical work. But, unlike Heidegger, he accents on “merge of horizons”. The theme of ‘epochs’ and their different ‘bases’ goes behind the theme of language and its universalism and medial essence, which provides solving of science historicity

problem through making conditions for the link between the Past and the Present horizons. Let's see how it can be.

Historicity remains a problem for Gadamer when he asks: "How within quick changes can be some permanent truth?" [5; 58]. "In his *What is truth?* Gadamer says that a researcher always interprets history in his own way. History is rewritten every time because it is interpreted through the present" [5; 36]. But "language is a fusion of the past and the present horizons", so "any thought can be cleared through its own language tradition" [5; 60]. Gadamer's book *Truth and Method* is devoted to this problem.

The chapter *The basic features of hermeneutical experience* embodies the "rise of the comprehension of historicity to the hermeneutical principle". "We belong to history" [2; 329] and the "consciousness of a personality is a single event in a closed link-chain of history". The image of "a closed link-chain" reflects "circular comprehension structure", which works through its 'pre-structure', which was discovered by Heidegger and notes 'pre-interpretation' of the world for the historical consciousness. The world is already interpreted through language. In *The History of Notions as Philosophy* Gadamer specifies: "Language is the whole forecasted interpretation of the world, and in this sense it is essential" [7; 29]. Prior to any philosophically centered idea the world is interpreted by the language. That is why we should speak about the 'self dialogue' and the 'foreign dialogue', which requires new relation to the superstition of comprehension ('recovery') and analysis of the procedures to control a modern researcher's comprehension in relation to the past events. Gadamer writes that hermeneutic conscience becomes completed in readiness to the experience, which an experienced man differs from a dogmatically prejudiced one; it must be "opened to the legend" [2; 425].

The "Legend" makes up 'a closed-link chain', which the thought of every interpreter of the past belongs to; that is why the language of legend, Logos, with its continuity gives a notional unity and guarantees the right comprehension. Language as Logos makes this 'chain', and everything empirically chaotic, which is behind the reflection tradition, cannot be 'linked' with it. In the chapter *Ontology of artwork and its hermeneutical notion* Gadamer shows the way the "total mediation" and "transformation into structure" is actualized in the artwork. It means that "all the writing links with the world are breaking" and it comes true as «an appearance of Logos in being».

The research of human studies approach made in Gadamer's book on the basis of Heidegger's "Dasein" concept showed that their historical 'truth' does exist. The text itself is a guarantee of exactness, a verificative criterion because it has an independent notional structure and therefore is understandable. A modern researcher inevitably interprets a writing of the past in a modern way. Still the relevance of its interpretations is potentially guaranteed by the text itself as a notional unity ("presumption of perfectness" by Gadamer) thus, it is not arbitrary but has a scientific status.

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