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SEVERAL PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE SEMANTIC DESCRIPTION OF EMOTIONAL TERMINOLOGY

SUMMARY. This article contains a logical-semantic analysis of emotional names. Emotional processes are examined in a twofold manner: as the result of a person's practical experience, expressed in a term's lexical meaning, and as the product of development of the grammatical subject (and predicate) category, reflecting various emotional and psychic processes. The author suggests that emotional processes (affects, emotions, and feelings) can be examined as stages of subjective-objective approximation, from which the semantics of emotional terms originates and on the basis of which it is formed. The author demonstrates that emotional terms could not have appeared at the stages of either "affective judgment" or "emotional judgment", as the subject was identified with either the object (S is O) or the action (SV is O). Only at the stage of the "judgment of feeling" did appearance of the first emotional terms become possible, since the relationship (S is P) replaces action between the subject and the object. From the logical and grammatical standpoint, this refers to the varying nature of predicativity, as predicative attitudes pertain not to the grammatical subject, but to the speaker. Hence, they do not influence the semantics of the predicate, and the latter proves to be counterposed to action. This opposition comprises the logical and grammatical basis of active-typology languages. The process of identifying the speaker's subject with the acting agent and of reflecting the subjective attitude in a language later leads to the expression of the "psychic" in the variety of predicative forms. Along with the verbal predicate, there appear nominal, adjectival, finite (impersonal verb), and infinite (participle) ones.

KEY WORDS. "Affective" judgment, "emotional proper" judgment, the judgment "of feelings", subject and predicate: identity and possessive relationships; affective construction and affective verbs.

A semantic description of emotional terms must necessarily be linked to the problem of reflection of the subject category in language, for only in the subject and through the subject does language express various emotional states. Consequently, it is impossible to describe adequately this kind of lexicon without considering the historical forms of expressing the grammatical subject. At the same time, we know that emotion is not only a phenomenon of the psyche, reflected on the level of linguistic structure — morphology, syntax, and lexicon — but is also a particular form of perceiving outside reality, being its axiological point of reference. It is in emotion (in the broad sense of the word) and through emotion that subjective-objective relationships find their initial expression.

There is every reason to believe that the more deeply we delve into human history and, consequently, into the history of language, the more significant the role of emotional processes becomes in man's cognition of outside reality. The renowned psychologist Boris Dodonov went so far as to call emotional relationships at the dawn of human history a "preform of thought" [1; 30]. "Thus," writes A.N. Leontiev, "man's emotions and emotional expressive motions comprise not the rudimentary manifestations of his psyche, but rather the product of positive development, and play an essential and important role in regulating his activities, including the cognitive" [2; 63]. "Emotion," according to M.B. Arnold and J.A. Gasson, "arises each time anything is recognized as attractive or repulsive" [3; 197]. The degrees of this "recognition" may essentially be categorized using the well-known triad dating back to Immanuel Kant — namely, affects, emotions proper, and feelings — which here are considered as interdependent stages of subjective-objective approximation.

Thus, affects are that stage of the cognitive process at which their gesticulatory and mimic or verbal expressions become substitutes for objects and states in reality [4; 85]. In an affect, the personality is "paralyzed", "fused" with the object of perception: "The bear must already be there", as A.N. Leontiev figuratively characterizes the affect [5; 464]. This is why the first signs and symbols (gesticulatory and mimic) are inactive in nature, reflecting the object as the result of subjective-objective identity, of which the primary definitions, according to S.D. Katsnelson regarding the genesis of language, "are established outside of it" [6; 99]. Thus, the first "judgment" (and, consequently, the first knowledge man acquired) was the "affective judgement" S is O , where S is an individuum with his objective evaluations, and O is an object given in subjective perception. Under this approach, **the subject as a medium of activity, as an independent principle, separate from its action or state, cannot be expressed.** This is clearly illustrated by, for example, a linguistic artifact such as the suppletion of personal pronouns, inherent in all languages (Rus. *я — меня*, Old Slav. *азъ — мене*, Gr. *ἐγώ — ἐμοῦ*, encl. *μου*; Lat. *egō — mei*; Skr. *ahām — mama*, encl. *me*, etc.), which "signals the former existence of a certain subject that differed from contemporary consciousness" [6; 33]. This matter is clarified by the fact that personal indicators of inactive verbs in languages having an active and ergative typology have proven etymologically identical to the so-called appositive identifying the flexion of possessive forms of the name [7], expressing the owner's identity with what is owned [8; 207]. This allows the supposition that in this same way the subject of the action was originally identified with the object, without being separated from it. This phenomenon rendered impossible the emergence of emotional terms (in the broad sense of the word, inclusive of predicates) at the "affective stage" of linguistic development.

In contrast to the affective stage, at the emotional proper stage of cognition of reality an affective type of objective reality appears in the psyche, by virtue of which the subject effects its selective activity. Tactile subjective perception acquires an orientation, transforming into an active subjective action. The formula of emotional judgment acquires a form distinct from the affective, by virtue of the appearance of

the new symbol V (action): SV is O , where SV is the motivating activity for attaining the required object. The judgment portrays the emergence of subjective intension, *i.e.*, of subjective action, “getting between” the subject and the object, so to speak. In consequence, the action is contraposed to the object (inaction). However, here also in emotional proper judgment, the subject remains (grammatically) unexpressed, in that it continues to be identified with its action. The subjective intention that emerged in the “emotional proper” judgment has transformed the objective identity of the inactive actant* in the affective judgment (S is O) into the subjective-predicate identity of the active actant (SV is O) in the “emotional proper” judgment”.

On a linguistic level, this is expressed by the separation of the name and the verb, and, correspondingly, the opposition of the active and inactive principles which G.A. Klimov, in his contensive typology of active-type languages, considers primary [9; 55]. He reconstructs for the language’s ancient state an extensive semantic opposition of active and inactive principles oriented “towards relaying not the subjective-objective relationship, which here finds merely its implicit expression, but the relationship existing between the active and inactive actants” [7]. Still earlier, this particularity of ancient language was noted by C.C. Uhlenbeck, who examined it in the linguistic artifact of agreement of the forms of the nominative and accusative cases of the neuter gender and the accusative case of the masculine and feminine genders in all Indo-European languages (Sans. *yugám*, Gr. *ζυγόν* and Sans. *víkam*, Gr. *λύκον*) [10; 101].

The widely-known opposition of the Indo-European active and medio-passive correlates with the opposition of active and stative verbs, since the Indo-European verb, as Émile Benveniste states, “references only the relationship with the subject, not the object” [11; 185]. If we were to assume, the linguistic researcher writes, that a “typically medio-passive verb” (*e.g.*, Gr. *κοιμάται*, “he sleeps”, or Sans. *vardhate*, “he enlarges, grows”) will take (as a secondary feature) the form of the active (*κοιμά*, “he puts [someone] to sleep” and *vardhati*, “he enlarges [something]”), this would result in a reorientation of the action from the subject to the object; *i.e.*, transitivity [11; 189]. However, inasmuch as the premise of this supposition (“connection with the subject, but not the object”) lacks the concept of an object, such a reframing of the medio-passive into an active at the stage of opposition of the medio-passive and the active is unthinkable; consequently, in the Indo-European era there reigned a deep-seated semantic determinant of the active and inactive principles (animate and inanimate, respectively). The matter is resolved by the circumstance that the active diathesis represents an “active action”, whereas the medio-passive represents only a process or state. “At a very early period of the development of the common Indo-European base language,” emphasizes P.S. Kuznetsov, “the only categories distinguished were the category that expressed a state resulting from a completed

* The concept of actants that language historians have introduced to portray subjective-objective relationships at a given stage of linguistic development more precisely explains the process of subjective reflection.

action (perfect) and the category that expressed only the action itself" [12; 213]. This statement effectively postulates the implicit nature of the subject. To this may also pertain, and this may explain, the similitude noted by O. Szemerényi between the medio-passive forms and ancient perfectives, which, as is known, denoted a state and gave the impression of "nominal formations" (particularly forms of the third-person singular ending in *-e*) without any indication of the subject [13; 347]. Both reflected the state as identical with its subject.

Finally, at the stage of feelings, the objective connection becomes relatively consistent in nature. This occurs through crystallization of emotion in the object [14; 152], e.g.: a positive emotion regarding a young woman produces a feeling of *love* (hence the ambivalence of the feeling: despite the occurrence of situational negative emotions, the feeling of love remains alive in the person). For this reason, feeling is sometimes called an "emotional constant", and this is precisely what may be presented in the form of the judgment *S is P*, where *P* is itself either *O* or *VO*. Due to this, the identity of *S* and *O* (or *V*) is disrupted, being replaced by a qualitatively different relationship. Its signature feature is constancy, for which reason it may be called "existential". It correlates the subject with its actions and states as well as its own "features" and "attributes", which are not independent in nature. Grammatically, the subject is expressed first and foremost in the predicative use of the adjective and subsequently in forming a linking word.

All these deep-seated semantic transformations find their reflection in linguistic structure in a series of similar grammatical artifacts. First and foremost, this lies in separating out from the active category the category of "affective" verbs*, which contain a special indicator of the person in the affective state. Compare "the constructions of Assiniboine *ne wówapi yacíka mn-uha*, 'the newspaper you want by me' (where the verbal word form contains the first-person "affective-type" prefix *mn-*), or of the Iroquois language of the Seneca *aka-thu"-te*, 'I hear' (containing the prominent functionally analogous personal prefix *aka-*)" [9; 120-121]. A most important semantic feature distinguishing these from active verbs is the significance of subjective possession. It is no accident that Benveniste grouped them with verbs of possession [11; 214], while Stepanov in his semantic classification held that, in the end, 'to experience' and 'to feel' mean 'to have' [15; 142].

In characterizing the opposition of the active principle to the inactive, it is impossible to ignore the fact that Indian languages, which G.A. Klimov classifies as early active (na-Dene), lack both "involuntary action verbs", such as 'see', 'hear', 'love', and 'fear', and "possessive" verbs — 'to be present', 'to be located', 'to have', and the like, which directly indicate the subject [7]. The appearance of this class in active typology languages "gives rise to both a special sentence construction and certain particularities of the morphological structure and its ingredients" [9;

* For, due to its simultaneously active and passive nature, the emotional state cannot belong solely to either an active or an inactive subject (as occurs in active typology languages).

98]. There are two sorts of “affective” sentence construction: “affective” proper, and descriptive. The first, an example of which appears above, is expressed by the presence of a special indicator of the affective subject and complement. We find the descriptive construction in the “Kamayura language (Tupi-Guarani family), *tiara ne-juká?* ‘Are you hungry?’ (literally, ‘hunger you-killing?’)”, or in the Tlingit language, “*ta-tc uwa djáq*, ‘he has fallen asleep’, literally ‘through (-tc) sleep (*ta-*) he (*uwa*) has been killed *djáq*’” [9; 121]. It is obvious that at the foundation of the semantics of these expressions lies a specific objective action, which is transformed into a subjective state by presenting the action through a subjective attribute or feature.

Many linguists occupied with this problem believe that another highly important primary syntactical form of affective terms is the impersonal construction [16; 156]. Using material from the Germanic languages, S.D. Katsnelson vividly demonstrates that, in the third-person position, there occurred semantic transformations of the causative objective action into perception and feeling [6; 40]. At one stage it was personal (as S.D. Katsnelson writes), designating various totems. This could occur at the stage when it expressed affective and emotional judgments. The subject was not expressed, and was identical to its action and state. At the stage of feeling, recurring perceptions transformed the “known” into an emotional constant, into something always treated in a definite way, established once and for all, *i.e.*, an “attribute”, a “quality” of that which is constantly unknown. According to A.P. Yudakin, in the third person the subject establishes “a logical connection between itself and the world around it”, and reflects it in new grammatical forms of the predicate [17; 25]. Thus, the third person arises, which is not a person *per se*, but predominantly a logical subject, which may be either known or unknown. The appearance of emotional terms based specifically on the impersonal verb is due to the fact that the “reason” for the emotional state — itself the subject with its various attributes — is unknown.

Along with the linguistic forms depicting the logical subject and heralding the appearance of emotional terms, in addition to “affective” and “impersonal” verbs we must include the category of the participle, which, as is known, likewise represents action as an attribute or quality of the subject. It is known that “the predicative participle developed from the attributive” [6; 49], acquiring its hypothecated nature much later. According to A.V. Popov, a student of Potebnya, in the early period the significance of suffixes (*e.g.*, *-t-) of the passive participle in no way differed from the respective suffixes of adjectives: “(for example, *nasatus* — nosed; *carnatus* — horned, *etc.*)” [18; 488]. The attributive participle was formed by joining a nasal or dental symbol of a deictic nature to the verb root. Only later did they become subjective in nature. Like “affective” and impersonal verbs, participles were intended to portray an entire event, as opposed to active and stative verbs, which reflect the active and inactive subject (in active typology languages) in distribution with active and inactive action. In the participle, the pronominal indicator could specify both the agent (in this sense differing in no way from the verb) and the recipient of the action. Compare the Goth.

participle *drugkan*[s], which could mean ‘drunken, drunk’, with reference to the subject, or ‘drank it, (that was) drunk’, if the action was associated with the object; or *quman*[s], ‘he came’ (→‘[who was] come’) [6; 59] and ‘he was brought (→‘[who was] brought’).

A contemporary illustration of this meaning might be found in the pronominal indicator of absolute subject in ergatic-type languages, which when used with a transitive verb, express the object of influence, and with an intransitive verb, the subject of the action. Compare the Basque *n-a-kar*, ‘he [she, it] carries me’, and *n-a-bil*, ‘I go’. The indicator *n-* is used here to express the object of the transitive verb, and the subject of the intransitive verb. In the language of the Native American Dakota tribe, this role is filled by the indicator *ma-*: *ma-kaška* ‘(he) ties me’ and *ma-ŋa* ‘I am dying’, *ma-wašte* ‘I am good’ [6; 79]. The use of the same indicator in the role of both subject and object of the action would be impossible without changing the subjective link of identity with the verb root into an existential, substantial relationship.

Apparently, the absolute position of the subject was a transitional stage for the formation of the participle. In the formula *VP* for ancient participles proposed by S.D. Katsnelson, this new relationship is clearly visible, for *V* (the transitive or intransitive verb) links the indicator *P*, which takes on “the meaning of either the real object or the real subject, depending on whether the verb is transitive or intransitive” [6; 59]. As researchers testify, in Australian languages that have preserved the ergative (= active) structure in its most pristine form, “the participle is as yet unknown” [6; 103].

Thus, the appearance of the first emotional names precedes the formation of the category of the subject in consciousness and language, and this category instead finds its expression in the following grammatical forms: 1) the impersonal verb and impersonal construction, on the bases of which are formed 2) “involuntary action verbs” (G.A. Klimov), with special syntactical constructions (morphologically marked and descriptive); 3) the predicative adjective, which expresses the subject dually: a) prosodically and b) formally (by a personal or demonstrative pronoun added “to the word or nominal syntagma” [11; 206]); and 4) the participle (and participle construction), which not only portrayed a new existential relationship of the subject of the action with its action and state, presenting them as an attribute or quality, but which also allowed them to be associated with the object, in the context of the event.

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