© A.G. IVANOV, E.V. MIKHALKOVA, A.S. SHKOLENKO

decartus@rambler.ru, lin-sen@rambler.ru, oliveolove@gmail.com

TERMINOLOGICAL RATIONALE OF USING THE NOTIONS "IDEA", "VALUE", "NORM" IN CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

SUMMARY. This article focuses upon methodological issues of Critical Discourse Analysis, namely the terminological grounding of notions, describing at once social, psychological and linguistic reality. The modern methodology of science tackles these issues within an interdisciplinary field, erasing borders between different branches of the Humanities.

KEY WORDS. Critical Discourse Analysis, idea, value, norm.

Discourse Analysis represents one of the present-day scientific tendencies at the interface between psychology, linguistics and sociology. The object of this analysis is the discourse of different social groups reflected in individuals' speech. Yet, what is the object of discourse analysis? L. Phillips and M.V. Jorgensen in the book "Discourse Analysis. Theory and method" offer their own reply to this question. According to the authors, the object of discourse analysis in either case depends on the approach under which the discourse is examined. For example, there may be "common patterns" [1; 47] in the speech behavior of individuals; discursive practices of people; oral and written speech that reflects changes in a variety of discourses, etc.

In the work mentioned above, Phillips and Jorgensen provide a description of the popular conception of discourse analysis, that is, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Under this conception, Norman Fairclough in 1992 suggested the following three-part analysis model:


Figure 1. Fairclough's three-part model for critical discourse analysis [1; 21]

It seems obvious that the model components imply scientific description both of linguistic and social-psychological reality, reflected in the language. It is not by chance, therefore, that a lot of scientists, working in discourse analysis, when analyzing *texts*, make use of terms describing *non*-linguistic reality. However, they (scientists), no matter how, read as the text *social and psychological phenomena*, being behind these terms. Consequently, one cannot assert that discourse analysts simply borrow terminological framework (apparatus) from sociologists, psychologists and linguists, because the subject matter of their study is in an interdisciplinary field and depicts the reflection of social and psychological reality in linguistic reality. Let us consider in this article how discourse analysis' terminological apparatus is established in the course of perceiving social and psycho-linguistic reality, with as an example the following words: idea, norm and value.

In the number of notions selected to be analyzed, idea plays, probably, the key role for a specialist in discourse, as it is directly connected to ideology. Ideology represents the part of the text reality that goes beyond, which as is known, has always been of great interest to discourse researchers by virtue of the fact that ideology receiving language expression in discourse organizes and legalizes group activity [2; 3]. It is not the case, therefore, that a variety of works deal with the correlation between idea and ideology in discourse. Nevertheless, T. Van Dijk should be considered as a pioneer in researching the response to this issue.

So, an idea attracts the interest of a discourse analyst, first of all, due to the fact that it forms an ideology. In the book "Ideologies. A Multidisciplinary Approach" (1998), Van Dijk notes that in the Humanities there exists a gap between these notions. Ideas are studied in psychology, whilst ideologies usually are the subject-matter of political science [2; 5]. This gap has an impact on the scientific reasonableness of the notion "idea". Van Dijk points out that many authors tend to identify ideology with a *system of ideas* (for example, in Marxism these were ideas dominating at that time [2; 2]. But if ideology is built of ideas just as of bricks, then how to fit in this pattern the fact that ideas are regarded as psychological and cognitive unities, whereas ideologies are viewed as political and social ones? Therefore, Van Dijk comes to a conclusion about the necessity to enter into interdisciplinary (or, as it is called by Van Dijk, multidisciplinary) space. And, reasoning about the notion "idea", Van Dijk puts emphasis on the social side of the issue. Thus, investigating discourse, we deal with *social ideas,* and not with psychological unities. This means that their domain is not individual cognition, but *social cognition* [2; 6].

The bricks of ideologies, in Van Dijk's opinion, are not ideas in their absolute common or general philosophical sense; they represent *beliefs* shared with the group members. Van Dijk also frequently replaces the notion "idea" by *thought* if he speaks about what has come to an individual's mind; and if the thought is announced and shared with a number of the group members, then it turns out to be a social belief that builds into an ideology. As a result, Van Dijk suggests when describing ideologies to refuse the term "idea" at all and employ the term "belief", meaning the above-mentioned social belief [2; 18].

As it was stated above, social reality in discourse analysis often appears before scholars as a text. He considers also as text the values of social groups, expressed in speech directly or implicitly. In scientific writings, these words are placed in

context, indicating that a specialist in discourse analysis interprets them as text units. For example, the following quotation from the book by N. Fairclough "Analyzing Discourse": "It is often **represented elements** at different levels in texts; and the **institutional positions, knowledge, purposes, values** etc. of receivers" [3; 11]. At this point Fairclough makes use of a standard model of communication where there is a text, its levels and elements, a receiver of the text, of the message, and enters into the model cognitive and social reality phenomena, namely positions, knowledge, purposes, values, actually regarding only their representations in language.

Fairclough may present value also as a speech act component: "... taking on commitments to truth, obligations, necessity and values by virtue of choices in wording" [3; 12]. Here the speech act theory is discernible, elaborated by John Austin, John Searle etc. According to this theory, speech acts may be divided into several types; one of such types is represented by *commissives* (derivative of the English word "commitment"). These are speech acts by which a speaker pronouncing them is committed to do something or not. In this context value is regarded as a substantive component of the commitment, which the author of the text undertakes: to state, express, declare one's values.

In the scientific world view constructed by N. Fairclough, there is a place for a proper relationship model between the text and social, psychological reality, which appears in the form of values. Fairclough finds the intersection in the notion "assumption", borrowed from speech act theory. It is not easy to find an exact translation of this term into Russian. Traditionally, it is interpreted as "supposition" and is reconciled with presupposition, i.e. common ground for all communicators for a dialogue that is implied yet not announced aloud to save time and efforts. Thus, for example, if one interlocutor promises something to the other one, it is not necessary for him to pronounce that the words he said present a verbal guarantee against the fact that he intends to carry out some action, and he knows that the listener desires rather than does not wish this action to be completed. It is enough just to say "I promise to do something" and to leave all the rest in presupposition. But if presupposition is dealt with as a separate speech act, the term "assumption" is used more remotely and may imply any original assumption, an axiom, i.e. the thing to be taken for granted.

So, Fairclough's model includes three basic types of assumptions:

1. Existential assumptions: assumptions about what exists;

2. Propositional assumptions: assumptions about what is or can be or will be the case;

3. Value assumptions: assumptions about what is good or desirable [3; 55].

Fairclough brings in as an example of value assumption the English verb "help", which presupposes improvement of some situation: "help develop flexibility", i.e. to improve physical qualities if the system of exercises is meant. Value is defined according to the criterion "desirable/unwilling", the way the subject sees it, and is the motive to act [3; 55-58]. Consequently, value is represented as a certain psychological and cognitive unity, concentrated in an individual. For instance, if you do not want to develop flexibility you will not use this system of exercises. However, if you, without intending to do so, have developed your flexibility, this means that you have failed to satisfy your initial need, namely to stay inflexible.

And at this point discourse interferes — ideology by means of language convinces the subject, who wanted to stay inflexible, that it is necessary to be flexible and imposes on him the system of exercises to develop flexibility. Hence, discourse "promotes" the whole system of values, which are meant as the axiom, since the dominating group of people shares these values.

T. Van Dijk prefers a functional approach to study values in discourse and their impact on society as a whole, and not on particular individuals. He often uses the combination "values and norms". According to Van Dijk, they "presuppose moral order" of the society [2; 40], as opposed to, for example, "factual beliefs", which form knowledge. Moral is shared throughout culture, whereas values and norms may pertain to one group. For instance, Christian norms and values once shared by only a group of persons, determined the moral principles of the whole Western European culture throughout the Middle Ages.

Van Dijk entitles norms and values "social principles" [2; 150], "elements or conditions of ideological control" [2; 188], "moral or legal grounds for the judgment of official action" [2; 257]. Norms and values also participate in establishing relationships between groups. Meanwhile, according to Van Dijk, values play a specific role in the society. They represent "shared mental objects of social cognition" [2; 74] and, in contrast to certain group beliefs form the culture on the whole. Hence differences between cultures appear. Thus, one culture gives priority to a value, which in the other culture is considered less valuable; for example, modesty in Eastern and freedom of expression in Western culture types. In the meantime, Van Dijk notes that nomenclature of values for all cultures is approximately the same. It is hard to find culture where nobility, freedom, courage etc. are not at all valuable.

Norms as opposed to less flexible and far more universal values, according to Van Dijk, are not simply understood by an individual and then practiced in their original form during one's whole life. On the contrary, they constantly undergo changes that, first of all, are set in public discourse (for example, in Mass Media discourse) [4; 7]. This is due to a continuous coming of new information through Mass Media on situations regarding which norms have not yet been developed or have already gone out of date by virtue of the changed conditions.

Unlike Van Dijk, N. Fairclough often classes *norms* in the same line with such notions as *conventions* and *codes*. Thus, norms and conventions of verbal or non-verbal nature take part in the construction of discourse. In this process there are "relations, identities and institutions" [5; 64] that stand behind them, i.e. non-linguistic reality objects. Therefore, Fairclough to a greater extent focuses attention not on them but on the norms, which participate in communication construction. Thus, Fairclough cites Giddens, who believes that the very *constitution* of discourse is conditioned by the norms of communication. Fairclough considers "norms of interaction as moral order" [3; 41], which may be interpreted in a different way thus requiring discussion.

On the other hand, the non-verbal character of norms also attracts Fairclough's attention, when he analyzes the work by Michel Foucault entitled "Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison". Each individual, according to Foucault's conception, is measured in compliance with a normalizing standard [5; 52]. So, the norm is regarded not as order but as a certain scale, by which society is guided when

evaluating individuals. This evaluation links the norm to the notion of value, although their interrelation is not discussed directly by Fairclough as opposed to Van Dijk.

To sum up, it should be noted once again that in Critical discourse analysis the terminological rationale of using the notions in interdisciplinary space, where the subject matter of the study represents diversified reality, is performed not through a simple borrowing of meanings from several trends of humanities disciplines. As a relatively new branch of the science, Critical Discourse Analysis apprehended in the first instance the *general philosophical and everyday* meanings of the words "idea", "value", "norm" and also connotations, imposed by popular theories (see above: ideology in Marxism). Specialists in discourse analysis had to begin by mastering the part of disciplinarity under study in order to clarify what meanings are required for the terms in the field of discourse analysis. However, even after that these meanings were not re-created. They represent a multidisciplinary terminological synthesis from psychology, linguistics and sociology.

REFERENCES

1. Phillips L, Jorgensen M.V. Discourse-analysis. Theory and method. M.: Centre of Humanities, 2008. 352 p.

2. Dijk, Teun A., van. Ideology. A Multidisciplinary Approach. London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 1998. 365 p.

3. Fairclough, N. Analyzing discourse. Textual analysis for social research. London: Routledge, 2004. 270 p.

4. Dijk, Teun A., van. Racism and the press. London: Routledge, 1991. 276 p.

5. Fairclough, N. Discourse and social change. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006. 259 p.