
© V.B. SOKOL

Vasu108@mail.ru

UDK 165.62

E. HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF REASON AS ANTI-DISOURS

SUMMARY. This article concerns the problem of the discourse status of phenomenological rationalism by E. Husserl, with the example of reason phenomenology research as a key point of the phenomenological approach.

KEY WORDS. Reason, consciousness of reason, reason phenomenology, mental discourse, anti-discourse.

Beginning in 1904, i.e. during the period when ideas of phenomenological reduction as a key procedure of a new philosophical methodology were forming, the founder of phenomenology Edmond Husserl (1859-1938) started to realize the main task of "the only strict" science: forming a *principally new mentality* coming to a particular question with "the totality of mental habits" [1; 19] traditionally approved in the Western philosophical tradition. The dismal misunderstanding and "wrong explanations" of the recent transcendental phenomenology ideas Husserl had to face even in the circle of his followers were the reason for such serious reform of the traditional European rationalism. Researchers point out that in handwritten notes and in letters to friends, colleagues and students of that period, E. Husserl wrote about the necessity of a separate work on "advanced" phenomenology as a systematic study of "the reason critics". For example, in June 1904 Husserl made his first notes on the topic: "Phenomenology and the reason critics; phenomenological critics of reason" [2; 82]. In his diary dated 25.09.1906, there is a note: "First of all, step by step, it is necessary to consider the phenomenology of reason, and based on it to give a real description of logical and ethical reason phenomenology in the form of bilateral principles and basic notions... The first and most non-perfect outline of the systematical consideration was given by me in my winter term lectures of 1904/1905" [3; XIII]. During that period, impressed by intense study of works by Kant, A. Meinong, Y. Petzold and Ch. Cornelius, Husserl fortified his efforts to throw down a challenge to his own work: "First of all I suggest a new problem that I must solve for myself, if I have a right to be named a philosopher. I mean the critique of reason. Critique of logical and practical reason, evaluating reason in general..." [4; 45]. From April 26 until May 2 1907 in the scope of the cycle "The main part of phenomenology and the critique of reason" Husserl gave "Five lectures on phenomenology" and then "Lectures on things and space" in which he proposed a project of the full scale "reason critiques" realization as "a central task" [4; 49]. In his letter to P. Natorp (18.03.1909), a new approach to the phenomenological critique of reason in comparison with traditional European philosophical thinking is clearly visible: "No "Logics" should be expected of me in the nearest future, but a number of big works devoted to absolutely new, as I

suppose, critiques of reason; new, but standing in necessary historical succession in respect of Plato-Kant-Hume's problematics" [4; 54]. The phenomenology founder grieves that his "research devoted to the idea of rational phenomenological critiques are not published yet" [4; 84] (as it is known, the first systematized reflections on the phenomenology of reason were published in a first book "Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy" only in 1913). In the handwritten manuscript dated 1910 and entitled "Reflections on the right path for my research" (L II 14/7b) Husserl simply confesses: «My main intention concerns the problem of reason... The beginning related to theoretical reason, to the problem of nature and experience is contained in the nature of things...» [4; 86]. At last in the fourth section of the first book "Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy" entitled "Reason and reality", Husserl develops a common vision of his phenomenological formulations focused exactly on the "phenomenology of reason" (chapter 2 of the section). Going back to traditional problems of philosophy — truth, reason, existence, the idea, evidence — the founder of phenomenology demonstrates first of all an approach absolutely unusual for the western philosophical tradition in reason-rendering. The chapter "Steps of the reason problem generality" which concludes the book is a whole project, though frankly speaking, drafted quickly, assigning a long term prospect of phenomenology research as a science in the common structure of knowledge about human reason first of all. The project provides a branching variety of reason problems and accordingly it presets branching of phenomenological disciplines capable of covering as far as possible all aspects of the most widespread topic of rational reasoning.

To put a general question on the specifics of Husserl's rationalism, the fact that Husserl's phenomenology is a varieties of 20th century rationalism is evident for researchers. Very often a clearly seen transcendentalism in phenomenology's founder is characterized as "a renewed rationalism successfully opposed to Western philosophy's irrational tendencies" [4; 540-541], based on the ideas of skepticism and relativism Husserl devoted all his creative life to fighting. In the essence of Husserl's rationalism "renewal" we are especially interested in the "peculiar aporia" noticed by phenomenologists [4; 540]. On the one hand, many arguments prove the evidence of phenomenology as the theory of reason where *ratio* as an epiphenomenon of *cogito* is one of the constants of Husserl's reasoning. In "The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology" Husserl speaks about reason as "the entelechy" of the human race [5; 32] and basic theses such as "philosophy as a strict science", phenomenology as "the life world science", which points at specific indications of Husserl's "special" rationalism. However Aguirre sees "quite naive and even non-critical borrowing of old criteria of rationalism" in this part, paying more attention to the other part of "aporia", i.e.: Husserl's well known critiques of traditional classical rationalism, a concentrated example of which can be found in "The Crisis...". According to Aguirre Husserl's rationalism, the aporia solution is hidden in "a new model" or a unique "form" of the reason which is, on the one hand, indebted to the Kantian dichotomy of consciousness and reason and, on the other hand, the reason that resembles some features of classical rationalism left in "the shade" of the risen star of Kant's gnoseological system. Aguirre outlines the following specific features of Husserl's reason form [4; 54]: 1) the fundamental role of intuition (*Schauen*); 2) rational analysis does not go to the ratio, the *doxa*

is included as well; 3) transcendental belief is added as an intentional procedure (Meinen); 4) the sphere of "thought together" is added (Mitgedachte); 5) the importance of reflection gets stronger; 6) immediate reality and synthesis are newly united; 7) the real and actual are described in the focus of reason "vision"; 8) correlations of "reason-reality" are opened according to a new "phenomenology" originating in ontology as a special "existence region" of reason.

However, in our opinion, if correctly indicated Husserl's rationalism aporia is not negated by the specifics of something renewed in comparison with the classics of "reason's form", as functional and structural modeling of reason leaves imagination about it in the boundaries of the psychological paradigm of reasoning as a definite "region of existence". When Husserl expresses the target to overcome classical rationalism on the way to "a new, *absolutely changed approach to setting* compared to natural settings of experience and reasoning" [1; 19], first of all it reveals naivety of the traditional reasoning ontology binding reasoning to language. To be more exact: the founder of phenomenology is against the narve "it goes without saying" ontological-discourse dogma of an absolute equation of reasoning and so-called inner speech (discourse) as "the unified region of existence" (a thesis of psychologism from the critics of which Husserl started his phenomenology). For Husserl the essence of new phenomenological rationalism is in the discovery of previously unknown "aprior logics" in the apodictic undoubtedness sphere, opening into the phenomenological setting. The founder of phenomenology characterizes the new cognition setting as a special state of the phenomenological epoche (freedom from any kinds of opinion made on the basis of language under the power of this or that discourse episteme) which is a direct result of transcendental-phenomenological reduction, including the reduction of "the existence region" of classical reasoning. In "Logical investigations", characterizing the essence of intentional emotional "contents", Husserl divides reflection and reasoning as different acts of consciousness: "the essence of performing reflection is contained in definite acts: reasoning and reflection — as acts — must be differentiated" [6; 321]. S. Frank noted this evident fact of the uniqueness of Husserl's logic's "contents" in his introduction to the first Russian edition of "Logical investigations": "Husserl makes a clear and luminous boundary between the objective ideal-logical contents of reasoning and the subjective real-psychological process of reasoning" [7; 7]. Consequently, Husserl's phenomenological intellect and the reasoning of classical rationalism are located in different "regions of existence", which is clearly proved by the founder of phenomenology in his "phenomenology of reason" of Ideas I referring us to "the experience prior reasoning", and more exactly to "institutionalization in the system of experience varieties prior to any reasoning" [1; 472]. For Husserl, classical reasoning is "reasoning" in inverted commas, i.e. a "cluster of reasoning habits" which is the crucial obstacle on the way to the phenomenological rational description of the pure consciousness apodictic essence being the terminal reason of the phenomenology different "wrong versions" [1; 19]. Here we reveal the realization of Husserl's older ideas, one of the central ones in "Logical investigations", i.e. the idea of sensegenesis in "the lonely mental life" where senses are not joined with any sign system including language. It was Husserl who paid attention to the fact that in "the lonely" reflection of man with himself (in *discourse analysis* theory this form of "discourse practice" is called *mental discourse*), communication (sense exchange) is performed without any sign execution (including language). This special discovery of man's consciousness'

unique capability is noted by Husserl in volume 2 of "Logical investigations", outlining it as *the key fact for reasoning the phenomenological approach—the fact that senses appearance as acts of affection simultaneously with words in "the lonely mental life, where words do not serve as a sign" [6; 46]. In other words, senses are born in the consciousness regardless of the signs they are fixed with at the "exit" to the outer communication which means without any form of an idea or linguistic construction.*

In the context of the discourse paradigm, the senses of the "lonely mental life" of Husserl's intentional subject set a special phenomenological rationalism, transcendent in relation to the classical rationalism of Kant's transcendental subject, i.e. to discourse existence. The discovered aporia of phenomenological rationalism, strictly speaking, can be brought only to a definite "language game" constructing (under the influence of the natural setting naivety) an illusive impression about some duality of rational "experience prior to reasoning". Its discourse essence is in limitation of classical rationalism by boundaries of the "subspace" or the "fold" (Deleuze) of this or that discourse. Consequently Husserl's reason aporia overcoming is an escape from the power of any discourse. Phenomenological reason is the sphere of some anti-discourse which is precisely called "*consciousness of reason*" by Husserl: *it means not reasoning but acts of reasoning experience*. Only the sphere of anti-discourse senses pure experience immanent to consciousness of the phenomenological setting; the subject field of the rational research discovered by the "only strict science" of Husserl is consequently not accessible to natural-setting naive reasoning (i.e. the sphere of any discourse power) which the followers of the phenomenology founders did not manage to overcome.

It can be concluded that: 1) *Husserl's phenomenology opens the prospect of a new reasoning*; 2) *the essence of the new phenomenological reasoning does not go to the classical understanding of an idea as of inner speech and supposes disconnection with inner discourse and an exit to "the experience region prior to reasoning" consisting of pure senses free from language dependence (anti-discourse).*

REFERENCES

1. Husserl E. Ideas to the puree phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. Book one. M.: The Academic Project, 2009. 489 p.
2. Husserl-Chronik. Denk- und Lebensweg Edmund Husserls / Hg. v. K. Schuhmann, 1977.
3. Husserliana. Husserl E. Gessammelte Werke. Bd X: Zur Phanamenologie des inneren Zeitbewubseins (1893-1917) / Hg. v. R. Boehm. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966.
4. Motroshilova N.V. "Ideas I" by Edmond Husserl as an introduction to phenomenology. M.: Phenomenology-Germenevtics, 2003. 716 p.
5. Husserl E. Crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology. SPb., 2004. 399 p.
6. Husserl E. Collected edition. V. 3 (1). Logical investigations. V. II (1). Research V. M.: Gnosis, The Intellectual book house, 2001. P. 471.
7. Frank S.L. The preface//E. Husserl. Logical investigations. Mn.: Harvest; M.: AST, 2000.

* It is from here that the phenomenological anti-discourse giving the prospect of the natural setting escaping from "the discourse power" begins.