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**FREEDOM AND NECESSITY IN RATIONALITY
OF HUMAN COGNITION AS EXPRESSION OF ITS POTENTIAL
AND LIMITS ***

SUMMARY. This article reviews the potential and limits of rationality in human cognition through the example of the phenomenon of freedom. In particular, under investigation is the experience of rationalistic explanation of the dialectical unity of freedom and necessity. At the same time, the question of reason and mind involvement in the phenomenon of freedom brings the investigation out of the scope of proper human cognition into the sphere of "live" human interaction, to the domain of behavior, aspirations, hope and imagination. This article demonstrates that development of the common in vital activity of the extending human race requires generalization of aspirations, goals, hopes and dreams of a number of various individuals through freedom. Simultaneously, a conclusion is made not only about "activating" the mechanism of already explicit "necessity of freedom", but also about the danger of cross-cutting subordination of the mechanism to public and bureaucratic establishments.

The article concerns disintegration of philosophic and world-view integrity of the contemporary humanities knowledge; the power balance significance; necessity and freedom in a human being as an object of the humanities; necessity to establish freedom of creative investigations. In addition, a discussion is suggested, which deals with figural principles of existence of the common and generalizes in the form of the human freedom phenomenon, having been well-illustrated in historical aspect.

A conclusion is made about the necessity to determine the position of self-critical rationalism in human science. Such a position allows accomplishing dialectical unity not only as regards the necessary and occasional, the occasional and regular, but also as a sought-for unity of creative liberty and moral responsibility.

KEY WORDS. The humanities, rationality, necessity, freedom, the common, the universal, generalization, figurality, self-criticism, responsibility.

Dialectical unity of necessity and chance has a continued and complicated path of development in natural world. It is sufficient to point out its genetic variation. With the help of modern science, a present-day doctrine of necessity convincingly explains the fact of the contradictory unity of a steady genetic adherence to a biological program and deviation from this program due to various mutations. However, the "tsardom"

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of stern necessity does not disappear even when one kind of living beings or biological species defeats another one. Game patterns which appear on the upper levels of the animal world relieve just a little the uniformity of rhythms and cycles of a strong biological dependence.

Slowly growing in strength in the history of mankind, commonality and communication, first, in the context of absolute disunity of the society, contained all those strictly natural forms of necessity. The same necessity limited the dimensions and scale of the socially common, the process and result of communication. Being satisfied with basic things, a man of that time depended on natural conditions, circumstances of his existence which determined his true nature. The factors which accompanied or restrained this existence were unavoidable. The occasional, most certainly, caused amazement (“a-maze-ment”), i.e. it was completely unexpected for the mind. Much later appeared prediction and prevision. Statistic or probabilistic characteristics of behavioural freedom were missing in the restricted and extremely inconsiderable in number coexistence of close relatives. Patrimonial bonds left their traces on all sorts of spontaneous manifestations of interhuman independence.

A compromise character of reconcilability of necessity and freedom formed in the gradually expanding domain of patrimonial communication as figurative features of language and thinking. Any self-will in these domains was significantly restricted by the rigid standards of speech tokens and logical figures of thinking. For example, logical necessity of conclusions was complemented with the freedom of thinking from abuse of individual wishes and statements, as well as the freedom from obsolete habits and rules.

Such gradualism of transition to the world of freedom in human and social activity is first manifested in extremely limited historical horizontal forms of communication and generalization. The above is testified by multiple and typical pre-rational appeals to the figure of the forefather, to the behavioural patterns of lives of heroes, then to the ideas of fate or destiny, to the perception of divine predetermination of events and actions.

Unavoidable necessity of subordination predominated subconscious mind. Stone figures of ancient sphinxes, later, majestic figures of gods incarnated in various animals, and subsequently, gods assuming the similitude of humans and set forth for all to see, acted as certain speechless forces suffering no self-will and self-consciousness. The conscious and unconscious are still separated as freedom and necessity in general. Enigmatic muteness and mysterious shapes of sphinxes give evidence that rationality was suppressed at the very beginning. In this respect N.N. Berdyaev said that “up to the present day the Russian nation remains a sphinx whose riddle is not so easily solved as it seems to social-democrats” [1; 254].

It must be said that roadside stones with inscribed mysterious fateful warnings about the future are of considerable importance in Russian fairy-tales. The stones are silent, of course, but not in the same way as sphinxes. The characters of Russian epos become figurative here. Mysteriousness as the unknowable still remains in fairy-tales;

however, there are probably no fairy-tales without prompt messages (“prompt messages”).

A figure of oracle, obviously an intermediary, appeared in Ancient Egypt and Ancient Greece even in the earlier period. However, any attempts to strongly extend the limits of individual freedom terminated tragically. Yet Epicurus drew a direct link between freedom and chance. Later in the 18th century I. Kant did not recognize that free actions of a man were based on the human understanding of necessity. He understood freedom as something special lying between freedom and chance.

Gradual “drifting up” in rational striving for freedom is clearly stated in a tendency for transition from “the freedom of will”, so close to human nature, to “the freedom of conscience” and in the next place to “the freedom of speech”, “the freedom of the press”, “the freedom of text” and “the freedom of thinking”. According to Hegel’s doctrine, in this way the process of consciousness of freedom implemented by history seeks for its continuation even beyond the scope of Hegel’s cycle completion.

Figurative emancipation of freedom is very well represented in the sculptural sculpture of all times and with all attributes of gradualism and revolutionism of the process. History first speaks only of the relief-related and later of high relief-related escape of a human being from the geometry of captivity in stone of the Stone Age. In later periods we observe a long-standing combination of proper architectural functions with aesthetical and cultural elements in depiction of gods (Luxor, korai and atlantes of the ancient world).

Slowly but steadily freedom distinguished heroes and emperors by means of figurative sculpture. By means of liberation of the great, history and freedom moved towards emancipation of not only noblemen and commoners, but also, for example, of men of genius in art and in human creativity in different spheres. The power represented by figurative means was quickly filled and complemented with the creative activity of the talented and particular aptitude of individuals.

At the same time the liberation experience gleaned in wars and revolutions “re-fracted” into a rational thought generalizing freedom in the domain of civil, common, political and legal communication. The properly sculptural figurative art was being filled with such thoughts and ideas. This is proved by an ordinary comparison of the antique sculptural sculptures of Phidias, Praxiteles and the ideas of Falconet, Rodin, Vigeland, Vuchetich and many other ideas turned into sculpture. It stands to reason that the French sculptor Falconet combined his artistic possibilities with the cogitativity of Diderot when he designed the famous monument to the Russian emperor Peter I who cut through his way to freedom by opening “a window to Europe”.

Generally speaking, it was France, for the past centuries actively acting as a homeland of public liberties and freethinking, which brought sculptured figures to other countries as a certain mark of freedom. On the contrary, ancient Greeks, for example, made a present of the very same “Trojan horse” stuffed with destroyers of freedom to the Trojans. By the way, the ancient Romans considered taking out sculp-

tural figures of gods from Greece as a benefit, thereby confirming some cultural kinship. France managed to do it as naturally as it was necessary.

The fundamental Statue of Liberty was a post factum gift to the United States of America from the people of France as a confirmation of the right track and approval of democratic freedom. Having become an apotheosis of figurativity of freedom, the Statue looks like confirmation of necessity of freedom itself. Burdened with this mission on a global scale and apparently due to the irony of fate, the United State of America, as if spellbound by this task, from then onwards have consistently tried to introduce a democratic model of freedom by military and political means in almost all parts of the Old World and the New World. In our opinion, European rationalism and American pragmatism finally met at that point.

Hobbes probably anticipated this in the middle of the 17th century when he depicted a monstrous figure of Leviathan calling him “the Republic or the State being just an unreal person, though bigger and stronger than a real person whom he was supposed to protect and defend” [2; 6]. At least, in the process of evaluation of the unlimited power of necessity and freedom one ought to remember Hobbes’ implicitly important statement that “an endless object may not have an image. All images and phantoms [...] have figures; and a figure is a value limited in all senses” [2; 496]. Naturalization of a human being initiated by Hobbes in the Modern Age required naturalization of freedom. This allowed him to reveal full compatibility of freedom and necessity in social and state spheres. In this regard, Hobbes’s sensualism was ready to give way to rationalism, reserving the right for science to be the most authoritative source of knowledge [3; 248].

Having his own point of view on the historical unity of nature and society, Schelling took a step forward in comprehension of arrangement of social communication and generalization by means of a dialectic unity of freedom and necessity. In 1800 he wrote: “Over the first nature there should be placed the second nature, the supreme one, wherein the law of nature prevails, exactly that kind of law that is required for freedom. Consistently and with the same steady necessity indicative of how an action comes after a cause in material nature, in the second nature an obstacle to egoistic affection should come immediately after the encroachment on freedom” [4; 447]. Schelling refers this law to “a legal law” governing in the legal system [4; 447].

On the basis of the above-mentioned position, Schelling regards social and historical processes as materialization of legal establishment. Further come the words which sound almost as a sentence for the absolute freedom, because “it would be absolutely impossible to understand how it could be implemented with the help of freedom, which plays its impudent and totally free game in its relations with the state, without recognition that in this game of freedom, the course of which is history itself, an implicit necessity dominates bringing in what the freedom itself would never achieve” [4; 451].

Hegel’s rationalism, evolving and extending certain ideas of Schelling on dialectical unity of necessity and freedom, is manifested vividly enough in his “Phenomenology of Spirit” and “Philosophy of Right”. For example, he determined that “due

to its “slyness” the historical mind makes people serve the supreme goals of the universal by force of blinding passion and short-sighted logical deeds” [5; 307]. As a result, only “due to the “slyness of mind” the supposed despotism of individuals eventually turns into necessity of the global historical process, and forced actions of the same individuals — into a free demonstration of the universal spirit. The above-mentioned metamorphoses attain culmination by achieving free necessity” [5; 307].

Stating Hegel’s “Philosophy of Right”, a French representative of modern philosophical culture M. Gourinat reminds us that the ancient law has already “demonstrated that the freedom, being real, remains a privilege of certain people; and it cannot determine human substance in its generality. Therefore, one cannot deny progress in the freedom of people in their transition from the ancient to the modern right, as far as the latter considers freedom an inherent attribute of a human being. Meanwhile, the ancient law demonstrated limited but concrete and realistic perception of freedom, whereas the modern right, defines freedom in a general way and directly includes limitation and negation of freedom into this definition” [6; 472]. This serves as another example of finding out limits and possibilities in rationalistic use and building up necessity and freedom by extension and development of the sphere of communication, and its generalization up to the global scale.

Giving comments to the viewpoint of J.J. Rousseau and the philosophy of the Social Contract in general, M. Gourinat describes the social contract as an unsuccessful attempt of transition from the individual will to the universal will through abstract mediation by the general will [6; 476]. At the same time he states that “any power includes something spontaneous, i.e. it is the act of will separate from mind”; and “the state considerations make part of [...] the State will since it acts spontaneously beyond the universal rationality” [6; 477]. However, estimating the situation from the present-day point of view, he stresses and obviously confirms that “the rational self-consciousness of the society is developed only in the state; and different political, legal, administrative and other capabilities, really indispensable for managing a modern society in accordance with rational rules, are developed in the state as well” [6; 477]. The conclusion states that preparing the citizens for “understanding and acceptance of the universal” and bringing “universal rationality” into social life, the state itself immediately offers the rationality “first of all in the form of an absurd and petty paper chase or a dreadful dominance of technocracy” [6; 478].

Under current conditions the integrity and completeness of the object of humanitarian cognition are totally disunited, leading, undoubtedly, to disintegration of the aforementioned object per specialisms and to disappearance of the humanitarian fundamental character of self-consciousness. At the same time the unity of the subject and the object of humanitarian cognition, manifesting itself in the degree of integrity and maturity of the subject and object of historical activity and self-consciousness, actualizes the problem of limits and possibilities of rationality of humanitarian cognition in particular. In addressing the issue of the freedom and necessity ratio it acquires a complementary acuteness and a new meaning.

For example, counting on one-sided academese of such rationality may turn to be even more useless than mere ignorance. Imitation of natural science is also out of business. Of course, to a certain degree it is compensated by presence of non-rational, irrational or even “extra-rational” [7] situations in self-sentiment and self-perception, naturally, not without losses for proper science. Presence of art and religion somehow fills appearing hollows and cracks of the disunited human existence [8; 84-85]. However, the interreligious problems and contradictions reveal the disunity again.

We assume that alongside the rationality of actions and social processes, directness of consciousness and self-consciousness should correspond to the required rationality of cogitateness, which in itself is problematic in the situation of social and political scattering of needs, interests and objectives of a state, a civil society or common people. Finally, the rationality of scientific knowledge may contradict the rationality of legal character.

Meanwhile, the subject matter of human science is so specific and complicated, and the human being is so saturated with not only rationality, but also irrationality of his acts, aspirations, spontaneous movements and crazy projects that a usual path of science through generalization appears to be obviously inefficient. A more efficient method related to individualization [9] in humanitarian cognition takes into account the unique character of individual human existence and historical and cultural events.

Besides, as, for example, C.G. Jung considers, as a matter of fact, “there exists not only logical rationalism, but also rationalism of senses, since rationalism on the whole is a general mental set for soundness of thinking and feeling” [10; 373]. In other words, the aforesaid takes place under conditions of the unwinding spiral of individualization. C.G. Jung himself based his idea of maturation of individualization on the understanding of concentration of the existence of human self.

Herewith phylogeny and ontogeny of freedom are hardly compatible both in history and psychology. Hegel, for example, described this situation in the following way: “To become free [...] the nations should have preliminary passed through severe discipline and submission to the Lord’s will” [11]. In the opinion of Sartre, a man is condemned to be free when freedom becomes some hyper-historical definition of a generic human essence. Thus, freedom for an individual person is a great burden.

And then a strong neurotic reaction dividing freedom into “a freedom from” and “a freedom for” manifests itself. However, the rationalist Leibniz anticipated this dialectics of negative and positive freedom much earlier. In the philosophy of Leibniz, mind is endowed with the capacity to enhance freedom. However, as early as in the 20th century a vivid follower of positive freedom N.A. Berdyaev said that it is the rationalization of freedom which kills it. This Russian philosopher wrote: “Isolated in the kingdom of visible things, rational contemporaneity denies the faith and pretends that it does not need it... Knowledge is forced, faith is free” [12; 45].

It turns out that freedom, according to Berdyaev, is irrational in principle, therefore “it may create both the good and evil... The path of freedom transforms into self-will,

self-will leads to the evil, the evil leads to a crime” [12; 148]. Berdyaev affirms that the prime importance of positive freedom awareness as of the freedom for creation makes purpose and meaning of human sciences quite profound. Moreover, according to his estimations, the human race itself “regenerates into the humankind” [12; 261]. Thus, human “self-creativity” reaches coastlines in the world of despotism and self-will. At the same time, rationality in the human sciences requires profound re-thinking.

The universal scale of human essence, largely outstepping “generic” essence, requires refusing from desperation of force, i.e. while “brawn instead of brain” is accepted, a refusal from naïve kindness in characterizing its own impact on environment, a refusal from life fecklessness, from the extravagance of ideas, from self-destructive thoughts focused on the destruction of life in general. On the contrary, a specific manifestation of rationality in the area of human communication is prudence. At the same time rationally structured global compulsion to freedom is perceived now as “perversion” of the same freedom. Then, one can find salvation on the “islands” of irrationality in the “ocean” of contemporary pragmatism and rationality.

Or the vector of development turns to the identity of the objective and the subjective, the unconscious and the conscious, the necessity and the freedom reached (as if?!) only in virtuality of human existence, i.e. in what is completely unjoyful in the short term.

Stating all mentioned above regarding possibilities and limits of human cognition in the domain of necessity and freedom of human existence and the expanding sphere of communication and generalization, we offer our reader to return to the question of “a thing-in-itself” and “a thing-for-us”. In our opinion, with respect to a human being and the humankind, the possibilities, objectives, means and limits of human cognition are highlighted more clearly.

Firstly, incompleteness of man and mankind as “a thing-in-itself”, its extreme dynamism and explicit dependence on consciousness, self-consciousness and the science itself become evident. Substantive and object-based characteristics of man and society as of infinitely “communicating vessels of life”, the material and the ideal, the physiological and the psychological, are revealed as extremely controversial, disputable, as if reversed to the infinite past and infinite future, to the wholeness and completeness of the limited and the separate, to the incomprehensibility of the diversity.

Secondly, the attempts of science to get it all sorted out and arranged within a relatively short period of time are at least doubtful. The rational depletion of human essence would be destructive, first of all, psychically, while the principal rationalistic inexhaustibility of this essence becomes a wish of a humanist as a scientist “to lose heart”, delegating all to the faith. It is no coincidence that E. Husserl wrote in his work “Philosophy as a strict science” that “an unlimited scope of work appears in the course of phenomenological comprehension of essence” [13; 743].

Therefore, it is necessary to consider the role and importance of rationality of human cognition differently, i.e. from the point of view of transition and transforma-

tion of self-cognition results from “a thing-in-itself” to the features of “a thing-for-us”. At the same time we should certainly talk here not about egoistic opposition to the rest of the world, but about perfection, development, evolution of man in the infinity of the material and the spiritual. In terms of the aforementioned approach, it also is necessary to consider a problem of the humanities knowledge disunity, its integrity, the disunity and integrity of both an object and a subject of scientific rationality.

K. Popper’s method of critical rationalism in this case can be complemented with a self-critical rationalism of a humanist. And it is not at all connected with the scientific inferiority complex of scientists representing the humanities. It rather deals with a conscious self-restriction of mind in the sphere of common human ambitions, with a tendency for self-deception, vain enthusiasm and rigmarole.

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