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UDC 165

THE PROBLEM OF VERITY OF TRUTH THEORIES

SUMMARY. Proceeding from interpretation of cognition process as implementation of ontological human power, a decision of the problem of fundamental truth theories ratio is presented. The structure of self-given entity comprises "four worlds": the material world; the world, created by human will; the world, created by human sense realization; the world, created by human reason realization. Each of them following the other one grows on the basis of the preceding one, however, not above and not outside, but inside it, disposing, if compared with the previous world, of its own specific content. In the horizon of "reflection cascades" relative to these worlds, the truth reveals itself as unity of diversified definitions, each of them with necessity entering to the truth's content as its own inner moment. As a result, any non-classical truth theory may be understood as its subtheory, whereas the theory of correspondence as a general theory of truth.

KEY WORDS. The truth theory, ontological human power, "ontology of the worlds", reflection.

Recent researches in epistemology and philosophy of science quite obviously reveal the fact that solving many of the existing and newly emerged problems related to this domain call for clarification of functional potential of the notion of "truth", which, as one would think, is deeply studied and devoid of controversy.

Apparently, the core of the aforementioned subject does not relate to anthropological inclination to imitate a famous biblical character. And it is not connected with the fact that "when one discovers the truth, one also "closes" it and forgets about it" [1; 34]. And it is not even the fact, though it would be certainly more significant, that irrespective of quite many theories of truth, appeared for over two thousand years of development of philosophy, including correspondence, coherent, pragmatic, conventionalist, axiological ones, etc. — nevertheless, "the initial essence of truth" may be evaluated, following M. Heidegger's strict criteria, as just "resting in its hidden source" [2; 361].

Far more significant and crucial is the fact that current problematisation of truth focusses on evaluation of verity of truth theories.

The researchers, clearly inclined to one or another kind of deflationism, emphasizing abstractedness and low efficiency of presently available truth theories, endow the very notion of the "truth" with the features of remoteness, marginality and methodological exhaustiveness; and, some way or another, justify the idea of renouncing

it and replacing it with some other potentially “more constructive” notion. According to L.A. Markova, “the inexplicit border line between classics and non-classics, truth and falsehood, subject and object leads to the notion of “sense”, present in every party of the opposition”, and, being “neutral to truth and falsehood”, therefore “balances the oppositions” [3; 52, 54]. The arguments of A.P. Ogurtsov are more drastic. He says that “renouncing the idea of truth allows getting rid of both quasi-theological assumptions — an assumption of the “absolute truth” and its singularity (irrespective of the fact if it is interpreted as an unattainable transcendental ideal or as something quite attainable), and relativism, insisting that any rational scientific theory contains errors explained by socio-historical, cultural and biographic context” [4; 64].

It is true that most notionalists hold a traditional view in relation to the above-mentioned. According to this traditional point of view “the category of truth is the major notion of epistemology”. However, the viewpoints of most notionalists substantially vary in relation to evaluation of verity of one or another conceptual view.

Not an inconsiderable number of them considers the correspondence theory of truth to be the only true theory, originating from the works of Aristotle and referred to as “classical”, compared to which all other — “non-classical” — theories are qualified as laden with “the defects of subjectivism” [5; 57, 74-76]. Recently G.D. Levin carried out most comprehensive studies of the above-mentioned point of view and a gave detailed analysis of almost all the difficulties this viewpoint faces [6].

In their turn, the notionalists devoted to the “non-classical” theory of truth firmly defended the initial primogeniture and demonstrated exceptional heuristic possibilities of their common opinion.

W. James, for example, consistently and quite emphatically stressed that the notion of “the objective truth”, hypostatised by the correspondence theory, was “a nude term”, “a pure abstraction”, leading to “the world of fruitless schemes”, while “the truth” understood by the followers of Socrates including Aristotle from the point of view of pragmatism as a “kind of the virtuous” and, therefore, “a generic name for all kinds of particular working values in experience”, was the one introducing a human being who perceived it into “a rich and diverse world of concrete reality” [7].

In the same manner the followers of coherent theory of truth, referring its origin to Parmenides, as much inclined to interpret the opinion shared only by them as the most fundamental and valid one, in relation whereof all the other truth theories can be understood at the best as derivative rather than relatively equal. In particular, D. Davidson wrote: “I accept what can be called a coherent theory of truth and cognition; and the success of my thesis related to the above-mentioned theory, which is not at all an alternative correspondence theory, depends on the argument intended to reveal how coherence is at the same time a correspondence” [8; 245].

Though, according to far from being ironical recognition of I. Stewart, another reputable methodologist and historian of science wrote that “none of us knows why beauty is the truth, and the truth is beauty”. And all that remains in this respect is “to contemplate the unlimited variety of truth and beauty relations” [9]. In the tideway of more apparent establishment of a new — “post-non-classical” — type of scien-

tific rationality [10] a fresh impetus is apparently given to the axiological theory of truth associated with Plato by origin, since the obligatory methodological procedure of modern science is not only consideration of relatedness of knowledge obtained on the object of study to the peculiar features of used means and operations, the necessity whereof at due time was in fact detected by pragmatism, but also the reflection of axiological and dedicated structures relatively implicitly or explicitly rooted in it. “The objective truth as the target of the scientific undertaking is not attainable without axiological choice. Due to the choice, the subject-related properties of an object acquire sense bearing meaning and become a real object of cognition. Thus, V.Yu. Yakovlev states that truth cannot be expressed by strictly rational, logical and methodological means of a scientific theory, but it is a process of laying the emphasis on the object of cognition with the help of axiological procedures of understanding. Due to these procedures, the objective properties and facts “as a thing in itself” “are created” by a subject in the ideal (categorical) form “as a thing for itself” [11; 54]. Against this background, interpretation of the very concept of objectiveness as of a scientific and cognitive value acquires refined appearance [12].

In the early 1990s of the past century L.A Mikeskina offered quite an original approach. In accordance with her approach, the theories of truth developed by world philosophy should not be considered in opposition but “in combination as far as they are of complimentary character, and, in effect, they do not deny each other, but express epistemological, semantic, social and cultural aspects of true knowledge” [13; 78]. In recent times the idea of “complementary compliance” as of a compulsory requirement of “specific rationality” of the modern age is studied by A.V. Pavlov [14].

These are, details and nuances apart, the current conceptual approaches to the range of problems connected with the evaluation of truth of the major truth theories: the first approach, calling for “renunciation from truth”, whereby eliminates, as somehow significant, any claim of any existing truth theories for the verity status; the second approach is based on the idea of possible verity of only one truth verity; the third approach considers any truth theory as fundamentally impossible to be solely true, but, at the same time, allowing possible status of partial verity for each of them.

What is — no matter how paradoxically it sounds — the measure of verity of the aforementioned approaches? What are the criteria of a preferable approach as the only true compared with the others?

Being much different, these conceptual approaches taken in the same proportion may certainly not be equally true, but at the same time, apparently, one of them a priori may not be qualified as absolutely false. Moreover, in relation to each approach it is quite acceptable to assume the possibility of capture, maybe not always in appropriate form, of some definite “moment of the truth”, which can be revealed, comprehended as rational and retained in its positive content, but, certainly, not from the point of view of its original theory of truth as it is, but from the more methodologically concise and profound point of view, i.e. generally speaking, from the point of view of the systematic approach.

However, is further development of the above idea realistic? What kind of difficulties and obstacles can be faced? What are the milestones of this development?

It is quite evident that the approach declared as required liberates one from an extremely disagreeable situation of “the vicious circle” connected with substantiation of verity of one or another theory of truth by means of the theory itself as of a true theory on the basis of the idea of verity developed within the limits of this theory. But this approach does not liberate one, at least at the moment, from the so called “regression into infinity”. Every time such an approach requires that as soon as the desired system and synthesis concept related to verity of the existing theories of truth is reached, this methodological procedure is undertaken time and time again by including this idea as the existing one into the object field of consideration aimed at development of the even more concise systematic approach. To avoid this methodological trap, it is insufficient to transcend the existing theories of truth, it is necessary to leave the “mysterious and fascinating palace” of the truth *per se*, where the truth is left by itself and exists for itself.

Is it possible as a matter of principle to accomplish such a drastic breakthrough? Is there any available methodologically correct solution? Is it feasible at all to penetrate into “the secret of truth” by means of an escape from the captivity of truth?

In fact, any substantial “secret of truth” certainly does not lie in the truth itself. Eventually, it roots in “the secret of a human being” perceiving the truth [15; 110]. As far as, unlike any other living being, “neither nature in objective sense, nor nature in subjective sense is given directly to a human being in a relevant way” [16; 164]; this secret lies in the way of its existence in the world. A human being is not just an epistemological subject or some creature nesting outside of the world. A human being cognizes the world to such an extent, to which, exploring it, he asserts his existence in it. Problematisation of truth both “eventually” and “in the first place” is problematisation of the existence of a human being. Therefore, any balanced investigation includes consideration of a variety of fundamental problems connected with revealing of the place of truth in the system of tools for realization of its existence in the world.

What is this place like?

A human being quite a diverse creature in terms of his/her manifestations. As such, he/she exists in the world by implementation of the whole of his essential powers, each of which, being aimed at studying the world, acquires sense and origin not in itself, not in self-isolation from the others, but only in its unity with them, thereby providing a possibility of human existence as of an integral creature.

The essential powers of a human being are, of course, the powers of human essence, active forms of their manifestation. Each of them, considered as a specific one, is a particular way of this manifestation, or, as K. Marx defined in a more comprehensive way — “peculiarity of each essential power is exactly its peculiar essence, therefore it is a specific way of its objectification, its objective, real and true existence” [16; 121].

Therefore, specification of the essential human powers directly depends on one or another interpretation of human essence.

It is clear that any explainable in its natural reverence penetration into “the depth of the human essence” even if capable of claiming for some “complete” and “final” result in this relation, it is only due to its irrepressible and poorly reflected pretence [17; 72]. The mere fact of availability of almost immense variety of interpretations of the human essence explicitly indicates that it least of all can be understood as something precise and simple. If this is the case, then it is particularly acceptable to suppose that the human essence is a system-related and sophisticated whole in its organic unity. Firstly, since a human being is certainly far from being an angel, but nowise an animal, the human essence can be presented as a “material — spiritual” system. In his initial substantial definition a human being is oneness of the material and the spiritual. Secondly, as far as each of these essential components inside itself is differentiated into constituent elements, and each of them, in its turn, quite definitely correlates to a corresponding element of another essential component, the human essence can be presented as a system consisting of three main levels, or subsystems: “vital and willed”; “astral and sensual”; “mental and rational” [18].

On the basis thereof we can identify the main essential powers of a human being. Each power is aimed at the development of the world in its peculiar form.

The specific feature of a material and practical essential power is based on the fact that under a relatively defining role of the material element, the vital and willed subsystem is constitutive among the constituent subsystems, while both astral and sensual, and mental and rational ones are subordinate and depend upon it. Implementation of this essential power is immediately directed to development of the material world resulting in the world in the forms of welfare and justice practically-given to a human being.

The specific feature of a practically spiritual essential power or, as it is sometimes defined, of a value-oriented essential power, is based on the fact that under equal proportion of material and spiritual components, the astral and sensual subsystem is constitutive among the constituent subsystems, while both vital and willed, and mental and rational ones are subordinate and depend upon it. Implementation of this essential power is immediately directed to development of the practically given world resulting in the world in the forms of the good and beauty axiologically-given to a human being.

The specificity of a spiritual and theoretical, or cognitive, essential power is based on the fact that under a relatively defining role of the spiritual component, the mental and rational subsystem is constitutive among the constituent subsystems, while both vital and willed, and astral and sensual ones are subordinate and depend upon it. Implementation of this essential power is immediately directed to development of the axiologically-given world resulting in the world in the form of the truth theoretically-given to a human being.

Thus, a peculiar “ontology of the worlds” appears, besides being a bit more sophisticated in its system integrity than the one stated by K. Popper in his time from the point of view of “naïve realism” in his famous concept of “three worlds”, distinguishing as independent from each other “the world of physical objects and physical

states”, “the world of the states of consciousness, cogitative (mental) states and, possibly, of a disposition for action” and “the world of objective content of thinking, first of all the content of scientific ideas, poetical thoughts and the works of art” [19; 439-440]. In reality, in nowise without background, but on the assumption of a single and quite reliable argument, in any case not at all discomforted by the nets of epistemological contemplation, we can distinguish at least four “worlds”: material world; practically-given world; axiologically-given world and theoretically-given world; every following world thereof grows on the basis of the previous one, but not over it, and not outside, but inside it, disposing if compared with it of the proper content.

If we make here a relatively free comparison, then the given idea is rather in tune with Heidegger’s ranking of the essential steps of a challenging movement, a movement not without “defiance”, “requiring extreme patience and effort”, sometimes even on the edge of “downfall”, a movement to the truth as a movement to unconcealment or *aletheia* depending on one or another dwelling place of a human being: the unconcealed as its own “shadow” — the unconcealed as “more unconcealed” — the unconcealed as “the most unconcealed” — the unconcealed as “constantly overcoming this or that concealment of the concealed” [2; 345-361]. We should note that in this elegant interpretation of Plato’s “Allegory of the Cave” the truth is, undoubtedly, “time-dependent”, as far as it is not given at once as complete and ready, all the more directly. But it is far from being obvious that the truth in its intentionality also positions itself, i.e. keeping being its own self, it varies, and not only in relation to quantity, i.e. a degree, but also in relation to quality, i.e. forms of manifestation. Each form is coordinated strictly enough with regard to the level reached by a human being in his readiness to cognize it.

No matter how abstractive and loaded with metaphors the above ideas could seem, a real image of the required solution to the problem under consideration shows through the conceptual context quite clearly.

In fact, unlike the material and practical form of development dealing directly with material world, and unlike the practical and spiritual form of development dealing with the practically-given world and coming into contact with the material world indirectly through the results of practice, the spiritual and theoretical form of development is related to the material world indirectly in both practical and axiological respects. It means that the truth appears in the system of human existence as a unity of diverse definitions related to the above-mentioned forms of world development. Therefore, each of these definitions “taken” at the spiritual and theoretical level necessarily makes part of the truth its internal item: welfare, justice, kindness and beauty. In this light the coherence theory of truth may be understood rationally as reflection of our knowledge related to the content of the theoretically-given world; the axiological theory of truth — as reflection of our knowledge related to the axiologically-given world, the pragmatic theory of truth — as reflection of our knowledge related to the content of the practically-given world, the truth correspondence theory — as reflection of our knowledge related to the content of the material world itself.

Every following reflection taken in its specific relation to the material world is more radical, more substantial, more informative than the previous one, since it does

not only overcome its boundaries, but also retains its positive content in a dialectical way.

Truth is unity in diversity. Every theory of truth claiming for verity should be at least valid to the inner treasure of its content. That is why any non-classical theory of truth, taken as such, in its one-level reflexivity, appears as “inefficient” in its individual specificity. In its turn, the classical theory of truth, taken directly in its traditional interpretation, i.e. beyond and besides multilevel reflexivity hidden within, appears as “contentless” in its abstract generality. Obvious or hidden idealization of one and/or another modified form of truth presentation is a good soil for different deflationist theories of it. At the same time, it would be similarly incorrect to qualify the existing theories of truth as antagonistic and to admit that only one theory should be considered as true and opposed to the others, because, in this case, any possibility of revealing the real positive content including the theory itself is lost. It would be hardly adequate to interpret the relation between the theories from the point of view of complementarity, since, as one would think, quite appropriate, in the spirit of tolerance, consent of a number of similar theories of truth in their “aspectual” verity, leads to the loss of somehow reliable base for revealing a true position and a specific role of each of them in the integral idea of content of the truth itself.

Assumed in its own definiteness, any non-classical theory of truth, undoubtedly, being a conceptual elaboration of one point of the comprehensive content of truth can be understood, in the perspective of its inherent reflection, as true as any other similar theory. Assumed in the perspective of “the cascade of reflections” as a multi-staged methodological procedure, each of them by status is no more than a theory of a particular level, in relation to which the theory of truth correspondence understood exactly as a systematic and integral idea of the totality of truth content, appears in its concrete generality.

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